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THE "NEXUS OF CONTRACTS" 
CORPORATION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
vVilliam W. Bratton, Jr. t 
Firms are bundles of unruly phenomena. They entail not jus t  
production , but  production by groups of people.  Therefore, theo­
ries designed to contain and regularize the appearance of firms go 
beyond concepts about economic production to articulate concepts 
about communi ties . These concepts variously distinguish the indi­
v idual and the group, usually according the interests of  one or the 
o ther greater moment. 1 They change from generation to genera­
tion and vary from theoris t  to theori s t .  No s ingle comprehensive, 
obj ective theory of the firm has taken hold.  Firms s ti l l  represent 
different things to different observers . 2 
Given this ,  i t  would seem unlikely that any new school of firm 
theoris ts-even a new school armed with the methodological tools 
of  modern social science-could advance a radically al tered theory 
of the firm s imultaneously possess ing the virtues of accuracy and 
pol i tical neutrali ty .  Nevertheles s ,  a theory of the firm now advanced 
in corporate law l i terature, here termed the "new economic theory 
of the firm,"  makes this claim .'� This theory explains corporate rela-
t Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,  Yeshiva Universi ty .  This 
art ic le is  dedicated to Drucil l a  Cornell ,  with appreciat ion for her bel ief in  it .  l\ly thanks 
to David Carlson ,  Arthur Jacobson, Ian  Macnei l ,  Paul Shupack, Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone, and the participants i n  the Law and Economics Workshop of the Universitv of 
Toronto Facul ty  of Law, for comment ing on  earlier drafts ,  and to the Samuel  and Ron­
nie  Heyman Center on Corporate Governance, Cardozo School  of Law, for support ing 
the project .  
I See Horwi tz ,  Santa  Clara Revisited: The Devrlopmrnl ofCmjJora/e Theon, 88 W . VA. L. 
REV. 173, 179-81 (1985). 
The fundamental  ques t ion in any theory of the firm is whether the appropriate uni t  
of  analys is i s  the individual or the group.  For a pos i tive g loss  on  the firm and the prob­
lem of  conAict between the individnal and the group sec Vinogradoff,jundiwl Penons, 24 
CoLUM. L REv. 594, 594 (1924) ("An adjus tment  between selfrsh and a l truis t ic  tenden­
cies in  social l i fe is  rendered possible by the fact tha t  men are a l l ied not  on ly  by moral 
insight but  by the necess i t ies of business cooperat ion ."). 
2 Nevertheless corporate law presupposes some theoretical conception: "[W]e 
must  make some pre-legal cogn i tive peace wi th the phenomenon of the organizat ion 
before we can i n te l l igibly tackle the ques t ion of i t s  appropriate normative trea tment ."  
M .  DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSOr-IS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAU­
CRATIC SociETY 27 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
3 This phrase is  used despite the usage of the t i t le  "modern theory of the firm" bv 
the theorv ' s  proponents .  The " modern" t i t le  i s  not employed here for two reasons .  
Firs t ,  opponents  of the new economic theory cal l  their own ideas "modern." Sre Eisen­
berg, Xew .\lodes of Discourse 111 Cmpora/e Law Lztera!:tre, 52 CEo. WASH. L REv. 582, 582 
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t ionships and s tructures in terms of contracting parties and transac­
tion costs . 
This construct originated among economists ,4 but came ready 
made for use by legal scholars . I ts apparent objectivity and formal 
integrity promised the comfort and security of formalistic l egal doc­
trine .  Law and economics writers recast corporate law in i t s  terms5 
and succeeded in reorienting corporate law discourse-cos t  analysis 
of  corporate relationships in  terms of agency problems has b ecome 
commonplace.G At  the same time, manageria l i s t  concepts subsumed 
under the rubrics of " separation of ownership and control"7  and of 
"corporate governance"8 have fal len from their posi tion of general 
( 1984). Given this contest  for the legi t imat ing mantle of  modernity, prudence d ictates a 
neutral posi t ion.  Secon d ,  many of  the component not ions of  the new economic  theory 
have been around since the seventeenth and  eighteent h  centuries and therefore are not 
"modern . "  See Brat ton ,  The .\'ew Econonuc Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectrues ji-om His­
tory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1482-85 (1989) . 
4 Economists proclaimed a major  discovery. Professor M ichael Jensen,  one of the 
theory's originators, has  predicted that  this  infa n t  "science of organizations" wil l  cause a 
"revolut ion . . in our knowledge about  organizat ions" during the next two decades . 
Jensen,  01gamzatlon Theorr and Methodology, 50 AccT. REv. 319, 324 (1983) . 
5 See, e.g., Bays inger & But ler, Revolu tion T'ersus Euolutlon 111 Cmpmation Law: The 
.-JL! 's Project and the Independent Direr/or, 52 CEo . WASH. L.  REv. 557 ( 1984); Eas terbrook & 
Fischel, Close Co,porations and .-Jgenry Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); Easterbrook & 
Fische l ,  Cmpomte Control Transactions , 91 YALE LJ. 698 ( 1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & 
Fischel , Co1porale Control Transactions]; Easterbrook & Fische l ,  Limited Lwhillty and the Cor­
pam/ion, 52 U .  CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985); Easterbrook & Fische l ,  T'otmg 111 Cmpomte Law, 26 
J .L.& EcoN. 395 ( 1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel ,  l'oting]; Fischel,  The .-ljJjJraisa! 
Remedy in Cmpomte Law, 1983 AM. B .  FoUND. R ES. J. 875; Fischel,  The Cmporate Governance 
.\/o;mnent, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 ( 1982) [hereinafter Fischel ,  Cmpomle Gouemanre]; 
Kraakman,  Cmpomte Lwbillty Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J .  857 
( 1984); Levmore, .\Janitors and Freenders Ill Commemal and co,pora/e Settings, 92 YALE L.J 
49 ( 1982); Scott ,  Cmporatwn Lau• and the ".·lmeriran Law Institute Corporate Governance Pro­
ject" , 35 STAN . L. REv. 927 (1983); Wolfson,  .i Cnt1que of Co1porate Law , 34 U. M IAM I L. 
R EV. 959 ( 1980). 
G Several recent  articles demonstrate the prevclance of these conceptions;  they as­
sume contractual ism. On takeovers, see Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defmse Tart1n: 
.-1 Comment on Two .\lodels, 96 YALE L.J .  295 ( 1986); M acey & McChesney, .·1 Theoretical 
Analysis of Cmporate Greenmail, 95 YALE LJ. 13 ( 1985). On fiduciary duties and  the  possi­
bi l i ty of cont ractual  modificat ion,  see, e .g . ,  Bcbchuk ,  Limited Contractual Freedom 111 Cmpo­
mte Law: The Desirable Conslmmts on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820 (1989): 
Coffee,  :\'o Exit? Optzng Out, the Contractual Theory of the Cmporatzon, and the Spenal Case of 
Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 919 (1988) . 
7 See generally A .  BERLE & G .  M EANS, THE MoDERN CORPORATION ,\ND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967) . Proponents of the  "modern " theory have moun ted the a t tack 
on the Berle and Means thesis explicitly. See Cmporatzons and Private Proper ty ,  26 J. L & 
Eco N . 235, 496 ( 1983). 
H Defenders of "separa t ion of ownersh ip  and control" and of "corporate  govern­
ance" wi th in the community of corporate legal academics,  practi t ioners ,  and  policymak­
ers have responded.  See, e.g., .-Jmenwn Law Institute's Cmpomte Govemanre Projerl, 52 CEo. 
WASH. L.  R Ev. -!95 (1984); The ,-JLI� COijJmale Govemanre Proposals: Law and Erononurs, 9 
DEL.j. CoRP. L 513 (1984). 
The ant i -manageria l i s t  response to the new economic theory has engaged i t  most ly  
on  matters of practice. For commentaries on  bas ic  t heoretical assert ions ,  sec Clark,  
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acceptance.9 
The new economic theory ' s  core notion describes the firm as a 
legal fic tion that serves as a nexus for a set  of  contracting relations 
among individual factors of production. 10 This notion has achieved 
wide currency, showing up even in contexts in which the res t of  the 
theory has l i tt le or no inftuence. 1 1 Some have accorded this notion 
the weight of scientific truth 1 � : It has been received in the legal l i ter­
ature as an ontological discovery with immediate and s ignificant im­
pl ications for corporate law discourse .  
Thus received ,  the nexus of  contracts concept has been taken 
.·lgency Costs versus Fiducim) ' Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF Busi­
NESS 55-79 (j. Pratt & R. Zeckhauger eels. 1985); Brudney, Cmporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetonc of Contract, 85 CoLU M. L. REv. 1403 (1985); Buxbaum, Cmporate 
Legitimacy, Economic Themy and Legal Doctrine , 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 515 ( 1984) (arguing that 
economic analysis, though helpful, cannot be the sole basis for developing behavioral 
rules); Cox, Reflections on Ex .cl nte Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fazmess justifica­
tions for Luniting F1duciary Obligations of Cmporate Officers, Dn-ectors, and Controlling Sharelwld­
ers, 60 TEMPLE L.Q 4 7 (1987); DeMott, Beyond .\Ietaphor· An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879 (differentiating fiduciary and contract concepts). 
9 Doctrine respecting the nature of the corporate firm and corporate governance 
policies have changed substantially during the past twelve years or so. The extent of the 
change can be grasped by recalling the earlier discussions. The anti-managerialists 
dominated. The leading corporate law article was Professor Cary's attack on the Dela­
ware legislature and courts and his call for limited Congressional intervention. Cary, 
Federalism and Corpomte Law: Reflections upon Delaware, tl3 YALE L.J. 663 ( 1974). Popular 
literature advocated more thorough-going federal controls. SeeR. NADER , j . SELIGMAN & 
M. GREEN, TAMING THE GIANT CoRPORATION ( 1976). At that time. it seemed that some of 
the anti-managerialists · suggested reforms might find their way into the law through the 
medium of Rule 10b-5. See Cary, .wpm, at 699-700; Jennings, Federalization of Corporate 
Law: Part ll'ay or .·Ill the ll"ay, 31 Bus. LAW. 991, 1002-13 (1976); Rosenfeld, An Essay in 
Support of the Seond Circuit's Decisions in Marshel v. AF\>It' Fabric Corp. and Sante Fe Indus­
tries, 5 HoFSTRA L. REv. Il l, 127-34 (1976). Nobody seems to talk about federal char­
tering anymore. Today's anti-managerialist policy discourse looks to much less intense 
models of legal control over corporate behavior. See Schwanz, Genes1s: Panel Response , 8 
CARDOZO L. REv. 687, 688-91 (1987) (Professor Donald Schwanz commenting on 
changes in the thrust of corporate law policy discussions between the late 1970s and 
early 1980s). 
1 0 This formulation draws on the original language of Jensen and Meckling . .Jensen 
& Meckling, Theory of the Finn: .\lanagenal Behavior, .-lgmcy Costs and Owners/up Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. EcoN. 305, 310 (1976). See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 j.L. & EcoN. 30 l, 302 (1983); Jensen. supra note 4, at 326. For restatements of the 
concept in the legal literature, see e.g., Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1261-62; Kraakman, supm note 5, at 862; Scott. supra note 5, at 930. 
I I See Macneil, EconOIIIIC .-1 nalysls of Con tractual Relatwns: Its Shortfalls and the .Veed for a 
"R1ch Clamficatory .·lpjmmtus", 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1018, 1026-27 n.27 (1980); Whitford, 
Jan .\lacneil 's Contnbutwn to Contracts Scholars/up, 1985 vVIs .  L. REv. 545, 550 n.16; see also 
Coffee, Shareholders l'emiS .\lrmagers: The Stram in the Corporate Web , 85 !VIICH. L. REv. I 
( 1986) (corporate application of the contractual perspective in a more relational mode). 
I :2 At least one polemicist writing \Vi thin the framework of the new theory has 
claimed the legitimacv of "organized theoretical and empirical processes." See Wolf'ion, 
supra note 5, at 961. See also A. KAl!Fi\tAN & L. ZAcE..-,RL\S, THE PROBLEM OF THF. CoRPO­
RATION AND THE EvoLUTION OF SociAL VALUES (University of MA, School of Manage­
ment, Management Research Center Working Paper 1987). 
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for more than it is worth . I t  has not been well unders tood even 
though it has been well accepted.  It embodies less an ontological 
breakthrough than a shift of p erspective . Characterized in a law­
yers ' terms ,  the point that the firm is a nexus of contracts i s  merely 
an assertion, or a legal conclus ion.  Characterized in l i terary terms ,  
the  point i s  a metaphor. Characterized in the technical terms of so­
cial science methodology ,  the point i s  a tautology-a statement true 
by definition . 1 3 Unlike some economic theory , but like much legal 
theory, the nexus of contracts (and much of the theory bui l t  on it) 
res is ts  empirical verification .  As wi th legal theory ,  verificat ion de­
pends on the tes ter's characterizations of real world inst i tut ions and 
relationships . 1 4 Yet the legal academy has accorded the nexus of 
contracts a s tatus far higher than usual for the latest l egal conclu­
s ion,  metaphor, or tautology .  
This article explains the  overvaluation of  the nexus of  contracts 
concept .  I t  accounts for the new economic theory ' s  success in  the 
legal academy and identifies its serious shortcomings . It further 
proposes that we pursue a different contractual theory of the firm,  
one  which offers greater pos i tive accuracy and normative 
res pons 1veness .  
The new economic theory ' s  contractual perspective of corpora­
tions fares well in legal contexts because ,  in  practice, corporate rela­
t ionships do exhibit a s ignificant basis  of voluntary exchange . I ts 
contractual pictures better account for many aspects of relat ionships 
between corporate managers and security holders than do compet­
ing managerial ist  pictures . 1 " By pushing corporate legal theory 
away from a single-minded concern with " governance"-the posi­
tive law control of corporate h ierarchies-the new economic theory 
vindicates values widely held among those who deal with corporate 
law . 
But the new economic theory suffers from a single-mindedness 
of i ts  own, and, as a resul t ,  fai l s  to offer a viable contractual theory 
of the corporation . I t  employs a s trictly delimited concept of con­
tract congenial only to microeconomic methodology .  Richer, alter-
I :1 Jensen, supm note 4, at 329 . Identi .fving the idea at the core of new theorv as a 
tautology does not purport critique.  
I · 1  !d. at 332-33. It should be noted, howev er, that strategies for refutable imp l i ca­
tions are being pursued. Institutional theorists , for example, studv real world arrange­
ments and "match" transactions and governance structures . See \Vil l iamson, The Logzr of 
Economzc 01ganz:ai/on, 4 .J . L. EcoN. & ORGAN. 65, 72-76 (19S8);joskow, .L1set Spmjiczly and 
the Stmc/ure of l'erilwl Relatwnships: Empirical Evzdrnre, 4 J .L. EcoN. & ORGAN. 95, 95-102 
(1988). 
I . 'J  These relational po ints arc (a) the general acceptance of pro-managerial concep-
tions of management dut ies by state courts,  desp i te decades of  criticism bv lega l  aca­
demics, and (b) the ecl ipse of  managerial ism bv the rising market for corporate con trol .  
s·ee Bratton ,  sujna note 3, at  1499-1500, 1520-25. 
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native legal theories of contract fai l  to inform i ts  pictures of the firm . 
Consequently, i t  mischaracterizes corporate contracts , making nor­
mative and pol i tical assertions in the guise of ontological s tate­
ments . At best, the new theoris t s '  contractual firm makes a l imi ted ,  
but s ti l l  s ignificant, heuri s tic  contribution .  
This article offers a different ,  more relational conception of the 
contractual corporation, grounded in business practice .  It includes 
not only the discrete, arms-length exchanges that constitute the new 
theorists '  corporation, but also the managerialis ts '  hierarchical 
s tructures .  The article asserts that a contractual theory of the cor­
poration should not privi lege ei ther of these aspects of organiza­
tional l ife .  Ins tead,  their complex coexis tence should be  accepted as 
a s tarting point and the theory should go on to describe their inter­
relationship . The exercise offers the possibi l i ty of a neutral basis  for 
corporate legal theory-a basis permitt ing the unders tanding of 
normative i s sues in corporate law ( if  not their ultimate resolution) in 
an atmosphere free of exogenous pol i tical imperatives . C orporate 
law doctrine,  which has been sh ift ing between contracts ,  hierarchies ,  
and the s tate for more than a century, provides a useful  s tarting 
point in the endeavor to articulate this relational dynamic .  
The article has four parts . Part I describes the new economic 
theory . Parts II ,  I I I, and IV unpack it ,  i solating the nexus of con­
tracts concept 's  ontological and pol itical components in successive 
theoretical con texts-firs t corporate legal theory, then pol i tical the­
ory, and, finally, contract theory . 
Part I s tates the new theory, drawing on the primary sources in  
the economics l i terature . I t  places the theory in the larger context 
of earlier legal and economic thinking, particu larly the post-war 
managerialis t  concept of the corporation . It distinguishes two vari­
ants of the theory .  One, termed "neoclass ical , "  deconstructs corpo­
rations into transactions hewing closely to the neoclass ical 
microeconomic model .ll> The other, termed " ins titutional , " recasts 
the corporation as a series of contracts somewhat more relational in 
character. 1 7 
Part II appraises the new economic theory using concepts from 
corporate legal theory .  This analysis extracts the concepts of the 
firm operating deep within managerial ism and contemporary corpo­
rate law doctrine and then compares these concepts with those of 
the new economic theory. The comparison reveals a surpris ingly 
wide zone of present and poten tial congruence. At the same time, 
I t> See mfra notes 42-57 and accompanyin; text .  The phrase " n eoclass ical 
microeconomic model" i s  Professor Macneil's .  Ser genP1-rdly l'vlacneil , supm note I I. 
1 7 See mfm notes SH-67 and accompanying Iex t .  
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however, it shows that many of the new theory's assertions are too 
closely tied to neoclassical microeconomic methodology to permit 
their p lausible transposit ion to the corporate law context .  
Part I I I  appraises the  poli tical component of  the  nexus of con­
tracts , and rebuts the new economic theoris ts ' proposition that free­
dom of contract is a corporate law absolute.  The analys i s  reviews 
the new theory agains t  a range of propositions about govern­
ment/corporate relations-specifically, the concession theory of the 
corporate origin , the theory of sovereign coercion of contracts ,  and 
" public-private" debate over the nature of the management corpo­
ration . 1 H It draws two conclusions .  First ,  contrary to the ne·w eco­
nomic theory ,  the corporate contract remains an archetypical case of 
l imited contracting freedom. Second, corporate doctrine provides a 
better basis than microeconomic theory for an accurate and flexible 
positive political theory of the corporation.  
Part IV appraises the "contract" in the nexus of contracts . I t  
shows that the  new theory ' s  positive picture of the  management cor­
poration overemphasizes the discrete contract and unders tates the 
s ignificance of hierarchical relations . I t  also shows that the new the­
ori s ts lodge more legitimating power in contractual consent than it 
plausibly can sustain . Again the analysis concludes that corporate 
doctrine provides a better source of concepts for corporate legal 
theory than microeconomics ,  in this case a theory of the corporate 
contract .  
I 
THE NExus oF CoNTRACTs AND THE NEw EcoNOMic 
THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Proponents of the "nexus of contracts " tend to assert i t  flatly, 
without explication . Yet the concept is not self-explanatory. Even 
as they confront the claim that the concept represents a method­
ological and ontological breakthrough with radical implications for 
corporate law, observers have trouble understanding what a corpo­
rate "nexus" is supposed to be .  
Part I seeks to  clarify the  concept .  I t  se t s  out  the new economic 
theory's basic assumptions in a wider ins ti tutional context ,  drawing 
directly on the economics l i terature , rather than on the secondary 
accounts in the law reviews .  This expos ition permits clear iden tifi-
I H In  this art ic le ,  the phrase "management corpora t ion ' '  denotes l a rge mass-pro­
ducing corporat ions and other large corpora te ent i t ies ,  the shares of which are widely 
he ld .  The usua l  term, "publ ic corpora t ion ,"  is avoided because i t  imp lies a pos i t ion in 
respect of  a theory of the firm i n  quest ion . See mjla notes 1 23-33 and accompanying 
notes . 
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cation of the economics underlying the new economic theory ' s  legal 
conclus ions . 
Contras ting the nexus of contracts concepts with the opposing 
concepts  their proponents sought to rebut permits b et ter under­
s tanding. Therefore, this discuss ion begins with an account of 
the managerial ist  conception of the corporation that prevailed in 
legal and economic theory prior to the new economic theory ' s  
appearance.  
A .  The Managerial i s t  Conception of the Corporate Firm 
Since about 1 930, discussions of corporate doctrine and policy 
have been based on a particular management-centered conception 
of large corporate entit ies .  Until the new economic theory chal­
lenged it, this conception enjoyed such widespread acceptance that 
i t  preempted most deeper inquiry into the nature of the firm in legal 
theory . 19  
The managerialis t  p icture puts  corporate management at the 
s trategic center of the large firm.  Management , because of its ex­
pertise in organizing resources ,  possesses power and real d iscretion 
in its exercise .  Management ' s  power has three aspects .  Firs t ,  man­
agement groups determine the processes of production and dis tri­
bution. Second , management groups dominate enormous 
hierarchical bureaucracies and exercise authori ty over al l  of  those 
lower in the h ierarchy .  Third , management-dominated corporate 
enti ties impose externalit ies on those outside the entit ies .:.>o In the 
s tandard view, the corporate legal doctrine that emerged at  the turn 
of the century facil itated and protected management power.:.>1 
Many observers , here termed "anti-managerial i s ts , "  acknowl­
edged the accuracy of the consensus p icture of management power, 
but denied the legit imacy of management 's  posi tion. They charged 
in a three-part argument that management exercised its power with­
out accountability . Firs t ,  legal doctrine vests governing power of 
the corporate enti ty in the board of directors subject to s hareholder 
vote . Second, management in fact controls the board . Third, the 
financial community supports management. Therefore, manage­
ment groups are unaccountable to higher authority. 
Management ' s  defenders, here termed "pro-managerial is ts," 
countered with a two part defense .  Firs t ,  experti se legitimated man-
I !l This consensus p ic ture a lso was w idely held amongst economists as wel l . Ser 
Bratton, supra note 3, at 1 494-96. 
:.>o See, e.g., A. BERLE, THE 2 0TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 3 1 -37 ( 1 954); R. 
NADER, J. SELIGMAN & M. GREEN, supra note 9, a� 62 -65. 
:_>I See, e.g. , .J . HURST, THE LEGITIMi\CY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1 780- 1 970 59, 62, 70,82 ( 1 970); H orwitz, supm note I, a t  1 8 1 -8 3 .  
4 1 4 CORNELL L4. H' REVIEW [Vo l .  74 :407 
agement authority; the  management corporation functioned more 
effectively than any al ternative form. 22 Second, they offered assur­
ances of responsibi l i ty; managers ,  they insis ted,  were capable of 
s tatesmanship .  23 
The debate over the legi timacy of  management power involved 
disputes over the nature of the corporate firm at only one  level­
whether the management corporation was public or private .  The 
anti-managerial ists  analogized the management corporat ion to gov­
ernment to demons trate its public nature. If the corporation was 
public, then uncontrolled management i l legi timately wielded its 
power and should be  subjected to additional legal control s .24 The 
contrary assertion of the corporation ' s  private nature affirmed the 
legi timacy of the substantial discretion legal ly ves ted m 
management . 2 5 
The post-war law reviews contain extensive cnt1c1sm o f  corpo­
rate doctrine for its pro-managerialis t  b ias . This academic move­
ment gathered force in the 1 960s ,  eclipsing the pro-managerial ist  
approach based on managerial expertise . 2t> Anti-managerial ists 
dominated the la\v reviews in the 1 970s .27 Despi te this reversal ,  
s tate corporate law remained substantially pro-managerial i s t  into 
the 1 980s .2H 
Aside from the "public-private" disagreement, all partiCipants 
in  the post-war pro- and anti-managerial ist  debate held common 
managerial ist assumptions about the nature of the corporate firm . 
All saw the firm as a "structure" which gives rise to power relation­
ships . All agreed that management dominates the s tructure by  or­
ganizing subordinated factors of production .  And all  agreed that 
management owes its posi tion to its organizational expertise .  
��  SrP generai!_y VV. BAUMOL, BusiNESS BEHAVIOR, \1.'\LUE AND GRO\VTH ( l 959); R. 
MARRIS. THF. ECOt-iOMIC THEORY OF "l\1.-\N.-\CERIAL" C.-\PITALISM ( 1964). 
�:) Frug. The Ideolo,�y oj-Bureaucrat)' in �·lmrnuzn Lrrw, 97 HAR\'. L. REv. 1276. 1297-98 
(1984). 
24 Like government. large corporations took actions affecting those o u ts ide the or­
ganization. Like government authori ties, managers exercised their power by m eans of a 
rational ized svstem of control and administrat ion. Like government . the "publ i c" firm 
was a "poli t ical" enti tv .  Srt Latham, ThP Body Pohltc of the Co1jJomlion. in THE CoRPORA­
TION IN i\1oDERN SociETY 220 (E. ?\1ason eel.) ( 1960). 
25 The publ ic-private debates of the pro- and ant i -managerialists a re covered in 
more detai l  in the text accompanving notes 123-33 infra. 
2t; See Frug. sujJm note 23, at i 311. 
�7 See. e.g.' Brudney & c:hi relstein .. -1 RPs!a!ttlll!lll o.l Corporate Free:pouts, 87 \'ALE L.J. 
135-l ( 1978); Brudney & Ch irelstein, Fmr Shares 111 Cmpora/e .\/e1gns and Takeovers. 88 
HARV. L. REV. 297 (197-l); Carv, sujml note 9. 
2K The l i terature on ''transfers of control" provides a good example of this phe­
nomenon. Academics argued stronglv against the legi t imacv of managers exchanging 
control power for money. Only a few cases took u p  the idea .  See B ratton, supra note 3, at  
I-!9R n. 135. 
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B. The Advent of the New Economic Theory 
We can precisely date the advent of the new economic theory 
with the publication of an article by  Alchian and Demsetz in 1 972 .29 
The appearance of Jensen and Meckling's  well-known analys i s  of  the 
firm made 1 976 the watershed year. 30 These papers proposed a 
p ic ture of management interaction with factors of production quite 
different from the managerial is t  p icture . Ironical ly ,  they appeared 
at the time the anti-managerial is t  movement in the law schools 
achieved maximum influence. 3 1 
The nexus of contracts assertion,  accepted in accordance with 
its intended meaning, displaces the management-centered concep­
tion of the firm. It maintains that the firm is a legal fiction that 
serves as a nexus for a set  of  contracting relations among individual 
fac tors of production .32 Unlike the managerial ist firm , the nexus of 
contracts firm is  not a hierarchy in which management determines 
terms by fiat .  Firms ,  said Alchian and Demsetz , have "no power of 
fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action. [They do not differ] in the 
s l ightest degree,  from ordinary market contracting between any two 
people . ":�:� "Management ,"  they concluded, usually described as a 
hierarchical exercise ,  i s  really a continuous process of negotiation of 
successive contracts .  '14 
The nexus of contracts concept opened up a new l ine of 
microeconomic inquiry-the analysis of the internal functions of 
firms within the assumptions and methodology of neoclas sical 
microeconomics . Before 1 972 ,  neoclass ical microeconomis ts theo­
rized only about markets . Their models explained coordination of 
the use of resources and distribution of income by the price sys­
tem'l5 and accorded the firm "black box" s tatus-a " production 
function" deemed to follow profit considerations exclusively and 
2�l Alchian & Dernsetz ,  Production. Information Costs. and Eroi/IJIIIIC Organi:at1on, G2 A M .  
EcoN.  REv. 777 ( 1 97 2 ) .  
30 Jensen & Meckl i ng, supra note 1 0 . vVi th  it appeared the "nexus of contracts" 
tautology.  S ign i ficant  substant ia l ly contemporaneous work on the theorv of the fi rm 
inc luded 0. W I LLIAMSON, l\1.-\RKETS AND HIER.'\RClliES: AN.·\LYS I S  AND ANTITRUST l!�.!PLICA­
TIONS ( 1975); K. ARROW, THE LIM ITS OF 0RG.-\'iiZ.\TION ( 1974); Smi th ,  Econom1c Themy 
and 1/s Disrontmts, 64 .-\�1. Ec:o N .  REv. 320 ( 1 974). 
el l Ser supra note 28. 
:�2 This school a l so i s  cal led the "propenv righ t s" school .  51'1' 0. WtLLL\:'>!SON, supra 
note 30, at 251-52. 
:n Alchian & Demsctz, sujJm note 29 ,  at 777. For exampk, the dissa t i sf ied part v  
alwavs can termina te  i t s  dea l ings wi th the firm. 
:l4 !d. at 794 .  
:)!) .Sre C:hueng,  ]�Itt (.'nnlrortuol.\.aturP n_/lhr Finn. �6J.L. & EcoN. 1 ( 1 983 ) .  Neoclas-
sical microcconomists  fol lowed Adam Smi th's dictum tk1t the divi�ion of la bor, and thus 
t he firm, marks t he exten t of the market . Thcv did not look at produc t ion  processes 
i nside the firm or at the con trac t ing  arrangements unclerlv ing them. SeP also Demsetz .  
Thr Stmrlure of  (hennlhij! (/1/r/ thr Theon of thr Finn, 2 G  JL. & EcoN. :375, 377-78 ( 1 98 3 ) .  
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behave as an entity in rational patterns no different from those of 
human actors .3G 
Neoclassical microeconomists accepted these l imits  on  their 
field of inquiry37 becaus e  they viewed internal corporate activities 
with dis taste. They perceived actions inside of firms as " engineer­
ing, " functions of hierarchical s tructures ,  and ,  therefore,  as un­
suited to a discipline that s tudies markets .38 This h ierarchical 
conception of internal firm affairs echoed the view prevalent in cor­
porate law. 
Ronald Coase made the earl iest  sugges t ion within 
microeconomics that operations  ins ide the firm could be described 
as contract .  In an essay published in 1 93 7, 30 he explained firms and 
markets as al ternative forms of contracting,  with the minimization of 
transaction costs determining the choice between the two . Coase 
saw the price system directing production through exchange trans­
actions on the market, while coordinators directed protection within 
firms .  Firms ,  said Coase, exi s t  where the costs of using the price 
system to ascertain the price are too high. But this seminal work 
achieved no noticeable influence unti l  after 1 970 .40 Even then i t  in­
fluenced the two variants of the new economic theory in different 
ways . Only the institutionali s ts  took seriously Coase's dis tinction 
between markets and firm hierarchies .4 1 
The Alchian and Demsetz and Jensen and Meckling papers 
opened a way around management h ierarchies and succeeded in 
bringing the interior of the firm to neoclass ical microeconomics and 
in bringing neoclassical microeconomics inside the firm . The nexus 
3G Their models '  assumpt ions  of  cost less creat ion and enforcement o f  contracts and 
of  perfect  information obviated the need to i nquire i n to organizat ional  deta i l s .  See Jen­
sen,  supra note 4,  a t  3 25-26; sa also Rosenberg, Com111ents on Robert He.>.1en, " The Jlodem 
Co1poration and Pnvale Propnty: A Reapprazsal," 26J.L & EcoN. 29 1 ,  295 ( 1 98 3 ) .  
37 For cri t ic i sm o f  t h e  neoclassical model see A .  CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE H AND: THE 
MAi'iAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusiNESS 489-90 ( 1 97 7 ) ;  McNul t y ,  On the Xature 
and Theory of Economic Otp,alll:ation: The Role of the Finn Reconszdered, 1 6  H I ST.  P o L. EcoN.  
233,  240-4 1 ( 1 984) .  
3 8 See Demsetz ,  The Theory of the Fznn Rev 1sited , 4 J . L. Eco N .  & ORe. 1 4 1 ,  1 42-44 
( 1 988) ; Jensen & Meckl ing,  supra note 1 0 , a t  306-07; 1\Ieckl ing, T'alues and the Cho1ce of the 
Indiuidua! 111 the Sana! Snmres, 1 1 2 ScHWEIZERISCHE Zr:ITSCIIRIFT FUR VOLKWIRTSCHAFT 
UNO STATISTIK 545 .  5 5 7  ( 1 976 ) ;  Wi l l iamson,  C01pomte Go;•emanre, 93 'r'ALE LJ. 1 1 9 7 ,  
1 220-2 1 ( 1 984 ) ;  Winter, On Come, Competena. and the Cotpora!zon, 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORe. 
1 63 ,  1 64-69 ( 1 988 ) .  This d i s taste is part of a w ider mistrust of nonexchange uti l i t y  
max imizat ion .  
3<) See Coase, The .\"a lure of the Fi nn, 4 Eco i\iOMICA c38(i ( 1 93 7 ) .  
40 Coase later said t hat  h i s  1 93 7  essav was "much cited but l i t t le used ." See Coase. 
Indus/na! 01gani:atwn: .·1 Proposal for Research. in EcoNOI\IIC: RESEARCH: RETROSPECT AND 
PROSPECT: POLICY !SSl'ES .\NO RESEARCH 0PPORTl1NITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
63 (V. Fuchs ed. 1 97 2 ) ;  .11'1' al.1o , Coase, The .\.a!UIP of tht Fum: .\IN111ing. 4 J . L .  EcoN. & 
0RG. 1 9 , 2;3 (I  (}88). 
·l l See 111(m notes 5(), ()() and accompanving tex t .  
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of contracts concept provided the means of success .  I t  pointed out a 
new picture of the firm in which hierarchy is irrelevant .  Under i t ,  
neoclassical microeconomists could discuss organizations whi le re­
maining within the traditions of their discipline and without sullying 
their hands with "engineering . "  
C .  The Neoclassical Variant 
1 .  Basic Assumptions 
The " neoclassical" variant of the new economic theory begins 
with the nexus of contracts and then builds models of the manage­
ment corporation that closely fol low the neoclassical microeconomic 
model and that draw on its body of assumptions . I ts actors are ra­
tional, economic actors driven by their divergent self- interests , -12 
and seeking to maximize values for themselves . They resourcefully 
conceptualize and predict future courses of action effectively. --�:.:s The 
neoclassical theorists reconstruct the firm as the product of their 
contracting behavior: Their contracts are equilibrium market con­
tracts44-instantaneous exchanges between maximizing parties . 
The parties make complete choices , deal ing with unknown factors in 
the exchange price .4 -'> 
The neoclass icists also make assumptions about the contracting 
process .  They assume effective competition among the contracting 
parties . They apply the principle of natural selection to successive 
generations of the contracts . This fol lows from their assumption 
that rational economic actors, consciously or not,  solve problems in 
the process of maximizing weal th .  Given their level of capabil ity 
and intense competition ,  only optimal contracting strategies 
survive .4 r; 
2 .  Basic l'v! ode! 
Within this framework, firm contracts take forms determined by 
the imperative of reducing agency costs . Contracts that al locate risk 
have winners and losers . Losers maximize their pos itions by taking 
actions to avoid having to perform their promises fully-the theo­
rists call this "shirking ."  Agency costs are the costs of shirking.  Ra­
tional economic actors know all  about possibil i ties for shirking and 
charge the agency costs against their contracting partners ahead of 
time.  Given competition , the party vvho most reduces agency costs 
4 2  J ensen,  supra n o t e  4 ,  a t  3 3 1 :  see also Fa  rna ,  .·I,!!,PII()' l'mble111s a n d  the Theory of/he Finn . 
88 J PoL. EcoN.  2 8 8 . 2 8 9  ( 1 �)80 ) .  
·U .')PP i'v!eck l i n g . .  1 11jJm note 38,  3 t  5 4 8 - 4 9 .  
4 4  Sr•e Je n s e n ,  SlljHrl n o t e  4 ,  a t  327 .  
� !>  SeP i\13cned . .  l lljn a n o t e  1 1 . 3 t  1 02 2 - 2 3 ,  1 03:l -40.  
4 ( )  Jensen,  SlljJm note 4 .  a t  :\ 2 2 ,  23 2 7 .  
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has the edge . And contract forms with the lowest costs survive .47  
Theori s ts apply this model  to explain a range of corporate arrange­
ments including such diverse phenomena as the positive l aw of rela­
tions among shareholders , boards of directors and officers ; the 
internal decisionmaking s tructures , policies , and procedures of cor­
porate bureaucracies ;  and the contracts firms make with employees,  
suppliers , and creditors . 
In 1 976  J ensen and M eckling published the most widely-circu­
lated of the model 's several treatments of shareholder-management 
relations Y' Their article set  out the model ' s  basic themes .  Manag­
ers act as agents to shareholder principals . When securi ties are sold 
publicly by management groups to outside shareholder principal s ,  
the purchasing shareholders assume that the managers maximize 
their own welfare and will bid down the price of the securities ac­
cordingly . Thus management bears the costs of its own misconduct 
and has an incentive to discipline its own behavior. M anagement 
increases self-control and thereby increases the sell ing price of the 
corporation's securities by offering monitoring devices . These de­
vices include such common features of the corporate landscape as 
independent directors and accountants ,  and legal rules against  self­
dealing:+ ') 
Subsequent essays expand the Jensen and Meckling picture, 
pointing out that pressures from the management labor market"0 
and from the market for corporate control also impel management 
to reduce agency costs . Commentators explain the received division 
See, e.g., 1(/. a t  33 1 -32 ;  Fama & Jensen, supra note 1 0 , a t  30 1 .  
See Jensen & t\leckl ing ,  sujJm note 1 6 . a t  3 1  � - 1 9 . 
4 D  This  explanat ion has been wide ly  employed in the law reviews . See e.g . ,  Fischel ,  
01gani:Pri Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Cfass Common Stach , 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 1 9 ,  
1 28-29 ( 1 98 7 ) ;  Fischel .  Corporate Gm•enwnrr, sujn a note 5 ,  at  1 262-65.  
Alchian and Demsetz 's  predecessor anicl e  a l so expla ined corporate s trunure in 
terms o f  agency costs .  But i t  had a d iH'erent focus. Jensen and Meckl ing built  a financia l  
model-they set out  a hvpothet ical  c lose corporat ion in which an 01vner m anagement 
group sel ls  equi ty to  ou tsiders.  Alchian and Dernsetz bui l t  a product ion model . d iscuss­
ing sh irking problems amongst ind i 1 iduals  on product ion teams. The exis tence of  man­
agement groups  i s  explained as a funct ion of  shirking bv  input factors .  l\Ion i tors ( i . e . ,  
managers) m u s t  receive power to  observe. Further arrangements a r e  necessarv s ince 
managers themselves wi l l  sh i rk .  Residual  income shares reduce th is  incen t ive .  See grner­
all\' Alchian & Demsetz ,  supra note 2 9 .  a t  78 1 -82 .  787-SH .  
'>0 Fama suggests tha t  management labor markets provide the pr irnarv d isc ip l ine bv 
( l )  forcing grea ter responsi\·eness in  rcl,·arcl ing performance (brought on bv outs ide 
rnarkct  for management hbor) , ( 2 )  �i nn perf(nmance being reflected in outs ide opponu­
.
mt\' wages ( i .e  . .  a firm performing IH: l l .  vis-a-vis prof i ls  and agencv cos ts ,  can demand a 
h igher price in the management labor marke t ) .  and (3 )  the incent ive created bv the in­
ternal  f irm market  for lo1, ·cr managers to seek advan tage over sh irking co-workers . Str 
Fama. supm note 4 2 .  a l  2�}4 -\ }5 ;  but VI' Kle in .  Contmrtmg Costs and RPslrfua! Claims: Thf 
SrjHuation of 0<L 'nnslujJ a111l Control, 2 G  .J . L\ w & Eco N .  3f.J 7 .  3 ()8 ( 1 983)  ( t ak ing  the  pos1 t ion 
t ha t  \\·age d i s c o u n t  cannot be taken in to  account in  wage con tracts ex ante) . 
"" . . ,· . 
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of authori ty between officers and director in terms of low cost infor­
mation flow. 5 1  
Proponents introduced this basic model to legal theory as the 
product of compelling science . But their science is not the kind that 
survives successful tes ting of fals ifiable propositions . The theory's  
several basic assumptions-contract ,  rationality, the des ire to maxi­
mize profits ,  competition,  and survival of the fittes t-s tate proposi­
tions as much political as empirical . Even accepted on their own 
terms ,  these propositions leave open a wide area for discussion. 
Within the model ' s  parameters one can rationally construct various 
and conflicting pictures of the firm .  Perhaps the theory ' s  propo­
nents concur on no single point-other than the nexus of contracts 
point itself. A single, detailed picture of the firm wil l  not emerge 
from the schooJ . S� 
The schoo l ' s  internal differences on who should bear the costs 
of managerial shirking i llus trate this indeterminacy . Jensen and 
Meckling's present the most prevalent view that agency costs reduce 
the value of the firm's  equity,  but the equity participations are 
priced so as to force the agen ts-the firm's  managers-to bear the 
costs themselves .53 Demsetz ' s  counter model maintains that agency 
relationships do not reduce the value of the firm's  equity at all . 
Rather, the costs flow through to the firm's customers and, given 
competition in the product market ,  no firm suffering agency costs 
could compete. Therefore, managerial on the job consumption will 
persis t  only if it  lowers the costs of production !  54 The differences in 
the pictures stem from different versions of the assumption of com­
petit ive markets . Demsetz 's  vvorld is more intensely competitive, 
and the firm looks different as a result . -'>5 
-'> 1 Fama and Jensen d i s t inguish between decis ion management ( the in t iat ion and 
implementat ion of decis ions) and decis ion control ( the rat ificat ion and monitoring of  
decis ions) . These funct ions become d iv ided because knowledge is w ide ly  spread in  
complex organizat ions and th i s  particu lar d iffus ion reduces cos ts .  SeP Farna & Jensen ,  
.wpm note I 0 ,  at  302-05. 
S:! See Winter, .wpm note 38, at I G3 (" . . I th ink we must acknowledge that the 
present s ta te  i s  one of incoherence . " ) .  
s •s See s upm text  accornparwing note 4 7 .  
5-t See Demsetz ,  supra note 35. at 379 .  
Dernsctz has  made ano ther  destabi l i z ing sugge� t ion more recent ly .  Transact ion 
and moni toring cos t analys i s ,  he  savs .  confine the inquin· too much . He sugges ts that 
s ights be expanded to inc lude informat ion cost  cons iderations .  Dcrnsetz .  supm note 38,  
at  1 54 .  
s s  Th e  bas ic  pictme i s  undermined one step funher h v  Kle in 's  po in t  that  agency 
costs cannot be presented for d iscount ing  ,,·hen actors price secur i t ies .  Klein.  supm note 
00,  at 3GR n .� .  This p ic ture d i ffers from the geJ"c'ra l l v  accepted transact ional  model of 
the new theory because of a s l ight ly  d i fTcn:nt  assurnptton respecting the calculat ive ca­
paci t\· of ra t iona l  economic actors .  
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3 .  The Rebuttal of the l\1anagerialist Picture 
The neoclassical variant ' s  picture of the corporate firm con­
tras ts with the managerialist picture and implici tly challenges i ts ac­
curacy . In the neoclassical p icture, the corporate entity-a 
prominent figure in the managerial ist  picture-almost disappears . 
I t  dissolves into disaggregated but interrelated transactions among 
the participating human actors .  Some transactions involve the fic­
t ive firm entity as a party, but  only as a matter of convenience .  The 
" firm" has no precise boundaries ;  unlike legal  academics , the ne­
oclassicists have no interest in categorizing transactions as occurring 
inside or outside of the firm .5G 
The separation of ownership and contro l ,  a partial b asis  of 
management power in  the managerialis t p icture, disappears in the 
new economic p icture . Ownership becomes as irrelevant a concept 
as the firm entity .  The "firm "  represents a mere series of  contracts 
j oining inputs to produce output .  Equity capital , the traditional 
l egal s i tus of ownership,  devolves into one of many types of in­
puts , -"'7 and the body of corporate law becomes jus t  part of  the con­
tract governing that input .  Assuming that the fittest arrangements 
survive, the contract 's profit-sharing terms presumably effect an op­
timal sharing of risk .5H The neoclassical p icture, then , affords no 
reason for government to intervene to protect shareholders . 
Even though the neoclassical picture purports only to explain ,  
its operative assumptions give it a strong normative aspect .  I t  im­
p licitly justifies what it  depicts by inserting a basis of arms-length 
contractual negotiation. For example ,  extant cus toms of managerial 
s elf-dealing must figure into the contract ,  or cost competit ion would 
have eliminated them long ago.  In the legal academy, the p icture 
coun ters the s tanding critique that corporate law establ ishes man­
agement power and protects  self-interested management behavior. 
Indeed the neoclassical picture denies al together the exis tence of 
the management power on which lawyers and legal academics have 
long focused their analysis of corporate law . 
D .  The Ins titutional Variant 
Economists see " the theory of the firm" as a uni tary discourse.  
But ,  for purposes of law and economics , different exercises in the­
ory have a materially different bearing.  The neoclassical approach 
!>(i  St'f 1d. at  3 7 3 ;  Klein .  Crawford & .-\ l ch ian .  l 'nllral fll lf,!!,WIIo/1, .·ljJpwpnabiP Rmls. and 
the Coll!fJf!l!lue Co11 1mrll llg Prorcss , 2 1  J L\w & EcoN. �97, 3�(j ( 1 978 ) : jenscn & l'v!cckl ing ,  
sujJm nol e 1 0 , a t  3 1 1 .  
!'> 7  Alchian & Dcmsctz ,  sujJ ia no te  �9 .  a t  78 1 -8 � .  
:S H  Klein ,  wpm n o t e  50, at  3 7 0 .  
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should be dis tinguished from the " ins titutional is t" approach taken 
by Oliver Wil l iamson and some others . The institutional i s ts work 
wi th different basic assumptions and produce a d ifferent model , 
whose posi tive and normative aspects contras t  less sharply with that 
of managerial i s t  corporate legal theory. 
1 .  Distinctions 
Several s ignificant d is tinctions can be drawn between the neo­
class ical and inst itutional variants . Firs t ,  ins titutional ists recognize 
the exis tence of the firm as a s ingle maximizing unit ;  their firm en­
t i ty represents more than an aggregate of transactions among maxi­
mizing individuals .59 While comprised of contract s ,  the firm entity 
constitutes a hierarchical "governance s tructure" s ignificantly dis­
t inguishable from market contracting.60 Ins ti tutionali s ts also follow 
Coase by inquiring into differences between market and firm 
organization. 
Second ,  the institutioni s t s '  economic actor possesses a wider 
repertory of human traits than the neoclass ical counterpart. Specifi­
cally, the inst itutional contracting party suffers from "bounded ra­
tionality" and engages in "opportunist ic conduct ."<> 1 Bounded 
rationality gives the actor l imi ted abil i ty to solve problems .  I t  pre­
vents  it from achieving the neoclassical actor's concrete risk analysis 
and from making such complete choices .  Opportunist ic conduct 
goes beyond the neoclass ical actor's self-interes ted maximization to 
"guile, " untrustworthy behavior deemed "culpable" by a lawyer. <>:! 
These human fail ings inform the ins ti tutionalis t  picture of the 
firm contracting process .  Actors know they cannot achieve com­
plete exchanges in all s i tuations .  In incomplete exchange, they 
leave terms open and consent to s tructures and processes to govern 
the relationship's  future . <>J Parties choose these "governance s truc­
tures " over market exchanges to guard against  appropriation:  
:1!J  SeP Macnei l .  511pra n o te I I. at I 022-23 .  
<;o Sre 0. WILLIAMSON , THE Eco"<OMIC INSTITUTIONS OF  C.'<PITALIS M :  F IRMS ,  MAR­
KETS, RELATIONAL CoNTRACTING 294-97 ( 1 985 ) :  W i l l ia ms o n ,  The .\lor/em Cmporation: Ori­
gins. Euolution, ,-! ttributf's . 1 9  J .  EcoN.  LIT. I 53 7, I 53 7 - I  546 ( 1 98 l ) ; srr also Spence,  .The 
Econolllzrs of Internal 01gani:atzon: .-In ln!rodur//()n, 6 Bu.L J EcoN .  1 63 ,  1 72 ( 1 975); ( a f­
fir m i n g  that ,  whi le  the l i n e  between the firm and the market  col lapses to some ex tent ,  
t h e  variet ies of  nonprice in teract ions  on the marketp lace,  the hierachical  n a t ur e  of the 
firm,  and t h e  con t rol managemen t exercises over resource a l locat ion,  m akes them mean­
i n gfu l l y  d i fferen t ) .  
< ) I Srr generally \Vi l l iamson,  supra n o t e  60.  a t  1 54 4 -4 5 .  
t >:l Ser Macnei l .  sujna note I I, at I 0 2 :)-24 n . 2 0 ,  for cr i t ic i sm of the concept  of oppor-
t u n i s t i c  conduct for i t s  fai lure to inc lude sel f- i nterested behavior  u n neces sar i ly  i nj u rious 
to <lnother party 's  i n t e res ts-a behavior pat tern � n c l ucl ed i n  the legal concept  o f  " bad 
fai t h . "  
422  CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol . 74:407 
where one or both parties ' performance entail s  investment specific 
to the transaction and opportunitism could threaten that invest­
ment, the parties invent a s tructure to mitigate that threat. Firm 
organization,  along with most  other forms of long- term contracting, 
represents such a mitigating transactional s tructure . 64 
Other factors affect the ins titutional i s ts ' transaction s tructures .  
Some, like free rider problems and agency costs ,  also fi gure promi­
nently into the neoclassicis ts ' models . 65 But the instit ionalists also 
consider nonrational influences , such as human attitudes . 66 Author­
i ty and ethics also enter into the parties '  transactional so lutions . 
Fiat may provide the cheapest way to solve problems; co-operation 
and reciprocity may reduce uncertainties ,  and hence costs , by caus­
ing expectations to converge . 67 
These considerations give institutionali s ts a more thickly tex­
tured picture of the firm than the neoclass icists present .  With its 
hierarchies , planning failures , and bad faith conduct, the ins titution­
alist picture often resembles the picture of the firm operative in cor­
porate legal doctrine. 
2. Commonalities 
We should not overstress the differences between the neoclassi­
cal and institutional variants however. Viewing the two approaches 
together against  the universe of alternative explanations  of the firm, 
they represent a substantially common point of view . 
The institutionalis ts ,  l ike the neoclassicists , view the firm as a 
construct of contract and explain its s tructural features as cost  sav­
ing devices of transacting parties . Like the neoclass icis t s ,  they es­
pouse a noninterventionis t  poli tical perspective. As a form of 
contract the institutionali s ts '  firm is private rather than public .  I t  
affords no apparent constructive role for public policy because the 
ins titutional i s ts reject the idea that "government has any special 
powers to reorganize the merits of organizational innovations 
. . . .  " Gil Like the neoclassicis ts ,  their methodology delimits the 
t > - l  See K l e i n ,  Cr;:nv ford & Alchian ,  :,upm note 53, at  �98, 307, 3 1 9  (examples of  firm 
speciftc i nves tmen t s  and t ransact ion s tructures ) .  See also 0. vV I LLIAM S O N ,  supm note 60, 
at 298-99, 30 1 -0::! ( a n ah s is o f  corporate organizat ion i n  terms of  firm s p ec i fic  invest­
ment ,  bounded ra t i o n a l i ty and opportu n i s t i c  conduct ) ;  Crossman & Hart ,  The Costs and 
Bmcfrts of Ownrrslnp: .-1 Thmrv of T 'n'llml and Lotnol /n trgmi!0/1 , 94 J.  PoL. EcoN. 69 1 ( 1 988) 
( i d e n t i fving owners h i p  o f  a n  asset  with residual  r ights  o f  con trol over t h e  a s se t ) ;  Wil­
l iamson,  supm note 57,  a t  1 546;  and W i l l iamson,  supra n o t e  38,  a t  1 209- 1 2 . 
t > '> Src W i l l iamson,  supm note GO,  a t  1 0-1 7 -4 8 .  
f i t >  0 .  W t LLI.-\i\! S O N ,  supm n o te 30,  at 2 5 6 - 5 7 ;  0 .  \V t LLI A M S O N ,  supm note 5 7 ,  at  4 05 . 
()7 0 .  v\' I i .LJ..\ M S O N ,  supm n o t e  30,  at :18 .  
t>H See W i l l i a m s o n ,  Olgru!l:n/I0/1 Form, Hrs1dual Clm m o n /.1 , and Co1jJomtr Control,  26 J .  
LAw & Eco N .  35 1 , 36 1 ( l lJS:3). 
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scope of their inquiry and analys is . S ince transaction cos t  reduction 
best  explains private contracting patterns ,  they seek to explain firm 
phenomena as means to reduce those costs ; i f  no such functional 
explanation appears at firs t ,  they keep looking. 
II 
THE NExus OF CoNTRACTs AND THE CoRPORATE ENTITY 
OF LEGAL THEORY 
The central recurring question addressed by j uridical theories 
of the corporate firm is the " entity or aggregate" inquiry. Thi s  
question concerns the  l ine of demarcation between the corporation 
and the separate relationships in  and around it .  I t  asks to what ex­
tent the corporate firm cons ti tutes a separate entity, possess ing 
characteris tics of  i ts  own, separate from the characteris tics of the 
persons connected with i t .  Finding the exis tence of a meaningful  
corporate entity raises further questions respecting the components 
of i ts  separate nature. One is  whether the corporate firm is  a real 
thing, whether i t  exi s ts , like a spiritual being, apart from the sepa­
rate exis tences of the persons connected to it . Or is  the firm entity 
a t  most a reification-a construction of the minds of humans con­
nected with the firm or otherwise aware of i t ?  Even if the observer 
concludes that only the reified firm entity exists , questions about the 
source and character of the ideas cons tituting the reification st i l l  
arise .  One question concerns personification of the firm-the ap­
propriateness of modelling the reified entity as an economic and so­
cial  actor with the behavior patterns of an individuai .u'> 
A s ignificant l ine of thinking, of which the neoclassical variant 
of the new economic theory is  the latest manifestation , applies 
methodological individualism to answer the init ial "enti ty or aggre­
gate" query . This thinking denies the existence of a meaningful  cor­
porate entity. It finds the firm 's  separate characteris tics to be  
ins ignificant and attaches determinant s ignificance to the relation­
ship 's  aggregate parts . This approach disti l ls  a contractual essence 
from the corporation.  
Many different answers to these questions have been offered 
throughout the his tory of American corporate law. 70 The first part 
below sets out the configuration of answers that prevailed around 
1 980 when the nexus of contracts concept appeared in the legal 
l i terature . The second part belovv contras ts this received legal con­
ception with the nexus of contracts concept and discusses the impli­
cations of their joint presence in legal theory. This discussion 
<i'l For a more extended discussion see rv!. DA'.i-COHF.N ,  supm note 2, at  1 5- 1 6 .  
70 See Brat ton,  supra note 3 ,  at 1 482- 1 500.  
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identifies the incompatible methodologies of microeconomics and 
law as the source of the boldest contrasts between the nexus of con­
tracts concept and the legal conception.  It fi lters out elements of 
the nexus of contracts concept peculiar to economics and ill su i ted 
to legal theory . It concludes that the legal conception of the firm, a 
capacious collection of ideas ,  wil l  function similarly, fil tering out in­
compatible economics and then assimilat ing the residuum of the 
nexus of contracts into legal theory . The ul timate benefit wil l  be 
heightened sensitivity to the relational elements that make up the 
normative i ssues in  corporate law. 
A .  Conceptions of the Nature of the Firm in Legal Theory 
The economists who first formulated the nexus of  contracts 
conception announced a teaching miss ion.  The world needed to be 
shown that organizations have neither consciousness nor independ­
ent rationality; the new theory would dispel the tendency to regard 
organizations as persons . 7 1 But the legal academy had no urgent 
need for the economists '  lesson because legal theory had assimi­
lated i t  almos t  a half-century before. 
1 .  The i'1hneteenth Cen tury Consensus Picture and the Turn-of-the­
Centw)' Dispute 
During the nineteenth century, a consensus picture prevailed 
which accorded the corporate entity a reified exis tence.  This pic­
ture, however, s imultaneously accorded private contract the genera­
tive economic role in corporate l ife .  The corporate entity 
represented a s tate-created juridical s tructure only-a " legal fic­
t ion" or an "artificial entity . "  The consensus p icture conceptually 
dis tinguished this juridical form from the conduct of busines s .  Cor­
porate business ,  l ike that conducted by individuals and partner­
ship s ,  was a contractual aggregate. n 
These concepts lost  influence near the turn of the century . 
Firm entities gained prominence in the economic and s ocial land­
scape as management corporations appeared .  Intensive discussion 
of the nature of the corporate firm ensued, lasting unti l  the 1 920s . 
A rearguard of observers hosti le to the new mass-producing enti ties 
challenged tradi tional doctrinal notions by introducing contractual , 
disaggregated conceptions of the firm . But theorists with the more 
prominent voices attacked the tradi tional doctrine from the other 
side, affirming the enti ty ' s  economic and social exis tence as w-ell as 
7 1  Ser Jensen, supra note 4 ,  a t  3 2 7 .  
7'2 See Brat ton ,  supm note 3 ,  at 1 502-08 (more complete descript ion of n ineteenth 
century doctr ine on the nature of the fi rm) . 
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i ts  juridical status .  These academics , influenced by European theo­
ries of group exis tence,73  advanced an organic theory : the corpora­
tion was an entity and was real . Group will and group loyalty 
combined in corporate l ife to transcend the beings of the individual 
participants . It created a new being with a wil l  of its own. These 
transcendental "reali s t"74 notions ,  supported the new management 
interest .7 5 
This " realis t"  theory attracted opponents,  who rebutted i t  with 
complete success during the 1 920s . 7G The opponent ' s  propositions 
about the nature of the firm provided the basis for a new consensus 
view and became the basic assumptions underlying corporate dis­
course during the manageriali s t  period that began around 1 930 .  
2 .  The Afid- Twentieth Century Consensus Picture 
The "anti-realist" consensus p icture emphasizes the firm's  ag­
gregate parts by describing the firm's  nature as a resul t  of the ac­
tions of human actors . 77 It explains habitual references to 
corporations as "persons , "  as a matter of convenience only .  7H The 
corporate entity remains ,  even so .  It retains a cognizable social real­
i ty even as i t  returns to the diminished status of a reification .  7� ) The 
firm, l ike other institutions ,  retains a meaningful exis tence as a sepa­
rate entitv because i t  carries on while individuals ,  with their nar-
1 
rower interests and whims , come and go .H0 This reified enti ty 
receives separate substantive content from the "common purpose" 
7� The most  i nAuential  European was  G ierke. SeP Radin ,  The Endless Problem of Cor­
porate Personn!i ly .  32 CoLUM .  L. REv . 64 3,  663-64 ( 1 932 ) ; Dewey, The Histone Background of 
Cmporate Legal Persona/tty, 3 5  YALE L.J .  655,  658-59 ( 1 926) ; V inogradoff, supra note 1 ,  at 
595, 602 . Sre also H orwi tz ,  supra note 1 (recent retrospective of  the turn of  the century 
discourse) . 
74 They are termed "real i s t "  because they hold the f1rm to be a " real , "  albeit  t ran­
scendental thing.  This " corporate rea l i sm" therefore has no  conceptual rela t ion to 
" legal real i sm ."  
7 5 H orwi t z  pos i t s  a cause and effect  rela t ionsh ip between rea l i s t  theo ry and the  suc­
cess of the manageria l i s t s .  See Horwitz ,  supra note I ,  at 1 76, 224 .  For cr i t ic i sm of th i s  
pos i tion ,  see Brat ton ,  supra note 3 ,  a t  1 5 1 1 - 1 3 . 
7<> Sre generally Dewey, supra note 7 3 ;  Radin ,  mpra no te  70 ;  V inogradoff, supra note I .  
Lit t le  d iscuss ion o f  corpora te real i sm appears in  /1.merican law reviews after the 
1 920s .  Indeed,  wi th  the c lose of  the debate over rea l i sm,  extended d i scuss ion of the 
na ture of the firm disappears from the law reviev.·s al together.  Apparent ly ,  those deal ing 
wi th corporate law found further d iscuss ions  unnecessary. 
77 Dev\l·ey, supra note 7 3 ,  a t  660-6 1 .  Berle ass is ted in the  t rans i t ion  of anti -real i s t  
ideas i n to  convent ional wisdom. See A.  KAUFMAN & L. ZAC H .-\RIAS, supra no te  1 2 . 
71-1 See Radin ,  supm note 73 ,  a t  664 . 
7 ' l  De\''ev, supra no te  73 ,  a t  673 .  
K O  Dan-Cohen, emphas iz ing the  meaningful ex is tence of the firm by i t s  l i fespan ,  
describes the  corporaLion as an " inte l l igent mach ine ."  M .  DAN-COHEN , mpm note 2 ,  a l  
49 .  
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of its participants . s 1 While collective, this entity i s  not col lectivist­
it enjoys a primarily  functional exis tence. I t  provides a means to the 
end of production, setting the common goals of the participants 
apart from those of the rest of  the world .  It also facil itates decision­
making and conflict resolution within the group and external action 
in the name of the group. 
This "anti-real ist" concept of the firm complemented the con­
cept operative in twentieth century corporate doctrine. In the doc­
trine ,  the corporation has held reified s tatus al l  along. The doctrine 
embraces a range of entity and aggregate notions and offers two 
models of the corporation . One presents the corporation as a sepa­
rate entity to which managers owe duties ; the other presents the 
corporation as an aggregate wherein managers owe duties directly 
to shareholder principals .s2 The facts of the s ituation , rather than 
some theoretical essence derived ex ante, determine the choice be­
tween the entity or aggregate models in any given s ituation .s3  
The "anti-real i s t" conception of the corporation continues to 
inform corporate law commentary . s4 Commentators differ over 
matters of degree, fil l ing in the entity reification with differing con­
figurations of group objectives , values , and actions . But they all 
subscribe to the picture's  broad ontological outlines . Even as  the 
commentator' s  political views vary over the contemporary spectrum , 
they share an individualistic conception of corporations .  Under this 
conception, the group exists to advance individual objectives . 
Al though the commentators recognize the existence of group and 
community values ,  they deny them as ends in themselves . 05  For ex­
ample, some legal scholarship calls for self-sacrifice in business rela­
tionships as an ethical proposi tion .  This approach invariably 
precondi tions the self-sacrifice on reciprocity in the relationship; 
duties to sacrifice always relate in some way to actual or potential 
returns of some kind .0(' The value of reciprocity assures recogni tion 
of the sacrificing party' s  interes t s . s 7  Contrariwise, the beneficiary 
K l I A.  DEW I N G ,  THE FINANCIAL P o u cy OF C o R PORATIONS 4 (5 th  ed. 1 95 3 ) :  Vino-
gradoff, supra note I ,  a t  603 .  
H2 In terplay between the two concept ions  pervades corporate doctr ine .  The doctri -
na l  d i \· i s ion of power between shareho lders and d irec tors provides a part icu lar lv  sharp 
con tras t .  Sl'l' i\:l . E I S E N B E R G ,  THF: STRUCTUR I:: OF C o R POR,\T l O N  85-94 ( 1 976) . 
H:) Br:at ton.  supra note 3, a t  1 508- 1 0 .  
H4 Ser. e.g. , C. STO N E ,  W H E R E  TI I F: LAW E N o s :  THE SociAL C o NTROL OF CoRPOR.\TE 
B E H A V I O R  6-7, 46,  48 , 5 7  ( 1 97 5 ) ;  Buxbaum,  supm note 8 ,  a t  5 2 7 ;  Kle in ,  Thr .\ !adem Busi­
ness 01gruu:atwn: Bmgaining l 'nder Comtramls ,  9 1  'YALE L.J. 1 52 1 .  1 523 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
K :> W h i l e  they have concerned themselves 1\· i t h  t h e  redis tribut ing corporate power, 
thev assumed ef ec t i ve crea t ion or wea l th bv corpora t ions in  pursuing this end .  
H(i Set p,enemlly Macnei l ,  EYrh ange Rrvisitfd: huh;•idual [ 't!lity a n d  Social Solida rity .  96 
ETH I C S  567 ( 1 98 () ) .  
0 7  t\·!acnei l ,  one of the more organic i s t  1vri ters on bu� iness rela t ions i n  the  contem-
.1 
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never gets something for nothing.  
Contemporary commentators tend to look past  the doctrinal 
corporation to constitutive contractual relationships .HH But this dis­
regard of doctrinal barriers need not entail disregard of the entity 
notion. In fact ,  contemporary contract theory which iso lates the val­
ues constitutive of long term contractual relationships-"relational" 
contract theory-permits the contents of the entity reification to be 
identified more clearly . Relational contract theory may account for 
the enti ty notion's prevalence and persis tence. The entity idea ex­
i s ts and matters because of heigh tened interdependence among the 
parties participating in corporate ventures and institutions .  Their 
posi tions demand ongoing cooperation , and the entity reification 
embodies and s trengthens common goals ,  such as the preservation 
of the relationship, that enhance cooperation.H9 
B .  The Nexus of Contracts Concept and Received Legal 
Theory 
1 .  Similarities 
The nexus of contracts concept challenges many details of the 
generally accepted picture of the corporation , but i t  does not chal­
lenge that picture's  fundamental outl ine. It does not assert that firm 
entities do not exi s t .  Ins tead, it modifies the tradi tional juridical 
theme of the corporation as a combination of reified entity and ag­
gregate parts ,  taking many directions already followed in twentieth 
century legal theory . I t  reinforces the proclivity to look through the 
entity to consti tutive contractual relations ,  the proclivity to look at 
the entity reification as a means to the end of wealth creation, and 
the proclivity to res i s t  the introduction of organicis t  thinking in 
business contexts . 
The ins titutional is t  picture reinforces the generally accepted 
pic ture with particular force .  Even though the institutionalists ins is t  
that cost reduction explains all firm phenomena, in the end they ap­
proximate the received legal picture. !)O They recognize the value of 
the firm reification, in effect offering cost reduction as the explana-
porarv legal academy, emphasizes reciproci tv .  Sel', e.g . .  I .  �1.->.CN E I L, THE NEw SoCIAL 
CoNTR,\CT: AN I N QU I RY I NTO ivl o o ERN CoNTR.\CTU.->.L R E LATI ONs ·-14 --1 7 ( 1 980 ) .  
H H  See. e.g. , Kle in ,  supra no te  84,  a t  1 52 3 .  Th i s  approach .  bes t  termed relational i sm,  
d iscards explanat ions and class ificat ions in  received doctr ina l  terms in fa\'Or of transac­
t ional  analysi s .  Macneil ' s  work during the 1 970s provided the groundwork. See generally I .  
MACNEIL ,  supra note 8 7 .  
H') See, e.g. , I .  l\-1.<\CNEIL,  51/jna note 87. at 30;  Macneil ,  l 'fl!ilfS 111 Con/mel. ln/nnal  and 
EYiemal, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.  340,  362-63 ( 1 983)  
' )0 For contrast between a broader relational approach and the cos t-reduct ive ap­
proach of  the in s t i tu tional i s ts ,  co111jJare iV!acnei l .  supra note I I . at  I 025 n .26 ,  wilh W i l l iam­
son , Tra nsarlion Cos/ Erononurs: The Govemanrr of Con lmrlual Re!a11ons . 22  J .  L\W & E c o N .  
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t ion for the appearance of the entity not ion in legal doctrine .9 1 
Their entity has a quantifiable value in the finn-specific knowledge 
of i ts employees . 9:! They associate cooperative and other col lective 
values with the entityY3 Their recogni tion of bad faith, incompetent 
actors , and openness to group values find easy analogues in  conven­
tional doctrinal concepts .  The insti tutionali s t  firm eas i ly could enter 
the legal mains tream, perhaps disappearing somewhere within i t .  
2 .  Con trasts 
Of course ,  the new economic theory does not merely reinforce 
the received legal  picture . The inst i tutional variant, while integrat­
ing into the juridical landscape with relative ease, reduces it and 
removes all details not consonant with the methodology of cos t  re­
duction .  The neoclassical variant poses even more s ignificant 
contradictions .  
The neoclassical theory conflicts with received legal theory by 
recas ting firm relations in  terms of discrete, b ilateral contracts Y4 
The neoclass ical theory deemphasizes the entity, attempting to s trip 
the reification of virtually a l l  substantive content .  The neoclass ical 
firm entity becomes a constructed reference point ,  bearing a rela­
tion to the economic substance of firm l ife analogous to the relation 
of a punctuation mark to the words on a written page . To find the 
firm's  essence, the theory looks solely to the behavior of individual  
economic actors . Unlike reifications ,  individuals produce goods and 
services ;  through their actions the firm performs its essential  cost 
functions .  
Poli tical ideals inform the neoclass icis ts ' firm.  They envis ion an 
environment of complete individual integrity and then recas t  group 
related thoughts and feelings in individual terms .  As a resul t ,  they 
wring the community values from the firm entity even as they affirm 
the legi timacy of much of the legal landscape .  Under s tandard legal 
theory, the firm reification embodies group interests which may su­
persede those of the individual participants in given situations .  The 
neoclass icis ts recognize these values but recharacterize them as m-
'233,  '236 ( 1 979 ) .  Ser nlso 0. W I LLIAM S O N ,  EcoNOMIC 0RG.\NI ZATI O N :  F I R M S ,  M AR KETS 
.\N D  POLICY CONTROL 1 03-30 ( 1 986 ) .  
<J 1 See, e g ,  Kraakman,  supra note 5, at 862-63 (ent i ty  l iab i l i ty  sh ifts  r isks t o  effi c ient  
r isk bearers) . 
�J:! Klein, supm note 50,  a t  374. Firm-specii ic knowledge i s  knowledg-e possessed by 
emplovees of the firm which is part icu lar  to the operat ion of  that  h rrn and cannot t rans­
late usefu l l y  to other firms .  I t s  value l ies  in i ts ah i l i t v  to lower operatin g  costs 1,·hen 
emp loyees are l�nn i l iar w i th  the procedures pecul iar  to  that fi rm . 
' ! :1 SeP supra text accompanying note  64 . 
!l-t SeP i\lasten , .-1 Legal Basisfor lhl' Finn , 4 J .L .  Eco N .  & ORe.  1 8 1  ( 1 988 )  (comparing 
legal doctr ine regarding employmen t with doctrine governing commercia l  contracts) . 
· i l · I 
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s trumental devices directly serving the rational actor' s self-inter­
es ted ends .  Cooperation becomes a means to the end of 
productivity. Team spirit arises not because of any inherent  value 
or because of psychological rewards of participation in group effort, 
but because it increases the pay off for individual s .  Corporate loy­
alty benefits the individual by helping him overcome sel f-des tructive 
tendencies to indolence.95 No other values exis t in group economic 
l i fe o ther than self-interested rationality . 
Despite themselves , the neoclass ic ists fai l  to denude the firm 
reification of all content .  Nexuses ,  l ike punctuation marks and other 
formal devices , bear on substance. Meckling, for example,  speaks 
of the "fusion" and "coalescence" of rational economic actors into 
firms ;% "fusing" and "coalescing" actors ,  l ike merging and combin­
ing companies , emerge altered. Alchian and Demsetz model the 
firm as a means to the end of team production centered on manage­
ment .  Their model gives the reification s ignificant content by infus­
ing i t  with the functions of the management team.'.l7 Jensen notes 
that the economic counterpart of the entity-based firm theory, the 
neoclass ical "black box" conception,  remains useful in some con­
textsYH He, in effect, recognizes that the entity performs many func­
tions inadequately described by cost reduction . Viewing the firm as 
an actor in the neoclassical marketplace doing things that markets 
cannot do demonstrates some of these enti ty functions . For exam­
ple, firms ,  whether sole proprietorships ,  partnerships ,  or corpora­
tions serve as repositories of productive knowledgeY�J They 
determine output and price levels in response to changes in data 
and then determine the quality of products before turning them 
over to the market for evaluation. 1 0° From the perspective of the 
outside marketplace, these actors are entities . 1 0 1 
�)5 See Alchian & Demsetz ,  supra n o te 29,  at 7 7 7 ,  790-9 1 ( formu l a t i n g  these 
characterizat ions) . 
% See Meckl ing,  supra note 3 7 ,  at 559 .  
97 See Alchian & Demsetz ,  supra n o te 29,  a t  787-88 .  Any elements o f  the ent i ty  n o t  
explained a re thrown i n t o  a person cal l ed t h e  "owner" who possesses a bundle o f  
righ t s .  !d. a t  783 .  Demsetz recen t l y  w e n t  so far as to mention "cooperat ive efforts ,"  
"con t i n u ity of  associat ion , "  and " rel iance on direct i on . "  as firm characterist ics .  Dem­
s etz. supra note 38 ,  a t  I 56. 
')H See Jensen.  supra note 4 ,  at 328 .  
�J'l \\' in ter, supra note 38, at I G9 .  
1 00 See McNulty ,  supm n o te 3 7 ,  at 24S--l 7 .  25 1 -52 .  
1 o I Con temporary economic l i terature from o u ts ide the discourse of the new theorv 
o f  the firm s i milarlv  affirms the proposi t ion that  group l i fe has a cogn izable social  real i ty .  
Havek's  comments  on the dangers posed b y  indiv iduals  grouped i n  orga n izat ions stand 
o u t  lor their  afft rmat ion of the social  rea l i ty of  the s tructures of  thought that  make up 
orga n izat ional  ent i t ies .  See 3 F .  HAYEK, LAw, LEG ISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE PoLITICAL 
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3 .  Incompatibz lities 
The neoclassical variant contradicts legal theory as a result of 
i t s  methodological s trictures and extreme individualism. For exam­
ple, the neoclass ic is ts '  methodology makes easy their u ltra-individu­
al ist ic dismissal of altruism as a delusion .  They recognize only 
rational economic actors . But legal theori s ts work from a different 
concept of the individual ; they recognize more holis t ical ly const i ­
tuted actors . These actors both subscribe to and act subj ect  to com­
munity values of giving and cooperation . 1 0:z Of course,  legal 
scholars deemphasize these communitarian characteris tics and envi­
s ion actors closely resembling those employed by the neoclass ic i s ts ,  
when considering some s i tuations ,  particularly bus iness  relation­
ships . Like economists ,  they sometimes treat altruis m  as a con­
tracting device and as a means to the end of wealth creation . 1 03 But ,  
even in business relationships ,  they recognize no principles that  bar  
them from accounting for altruism as a value  rather than an ins tru­
ment manipulated by self- interested individual s .  
So long as  legal theory recognizes the  possibi l i ty of  al truism 
and the related values of cooperation and shared goal s ,  and so  long 
as i t  associates them with the firm entity ,  i ts  conception of the firm 
wi l l  exclude the neoclass ici s t s '  picture of a contentless fi rm reifica­
tion. Values springing from group endeavor give the entity substan­
tive and normative content. They prevent the larger relation from 
disaggregating into a neoclass ical bundle of discrete transactions . 
Because these values have an ingrained character, their resis tance to 
the neoclass ical conception should endure. 
4. Asslm.ila tion 
This discussion of incompatibil ity does not suggest that no neo­
classical conceptions wil l  enter legal theory. Nor does i t  suggest 
that the new economic theory wil l  bring no improvements to corpo­
rate law .  But,  so long as legal theory resis ts  the core concept of  the 
O R D E R  OF A. F R E E  PEOPLE 90 ( 1 97 �) ) .  According to H avek, organizations d erive their 
p ower from the moral support o f  col lective action and feel ings of group l oyalty. !d. 
For a verv d i fferent exampl e  making a s imi lar point see A .  CHANDLER,  supm note 37, 
at 8. \Vrit ing about the emergence of the modern management structure, Chandl er 
notes that the management hierarchv became a source of permanence that " took on a 
l i fe o f  i t s  own. " !d. 
I 0:2 Someti mes these values aHect  the act o rs as  i nternal ethical driH·s and s o metimes 
thev atTect the actors as o bject ified communi t v  norm s .  
1 0 :1 See, e g. ,  Kronman, Con/mel Law and lhr Stale of .\'a ll/IF, I J L  E c o :-.; .  & O R e .  I ,  20-
2 3  ( 1 98 5 ) .  Kronman descri bes a " umon" concept, a contractual arrangement o f  part ies 
seeking to reduce d i vergence by promo t ing a spir it  of fel l ow-feel ing. The part ies estab­
l i sh routines to reinforce altruism. ,\]truism is thus a s tratcgv to reduce the risks of 
nonsimultaneous exchange, rather than a communi tv value i mposed o n  contracting par­
ties by  an outs ide agencv. 
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contentless reification , neoclassical conceptions wil l  fai l  to trans­
form legal perspectives in any fundamental way. 1 04 
The combined influence of institutional and neoclassical l i tera­
ture should bring improvement by encouraging more determinedly 
relational applications of corporate doctrine. Through this influ­
ence, the doctrine's  s tructures and norms will be applied with sensi­
tiVIty to the many dis tinguishing characteris tics of different 
corporate contracts .  Imagine a close corporation actually com­
prised of arms-length discrete contracts along the lines of the enter­
prise Jensen and Meckling hypothesized in their seminal article .  
Crude application of tradi tional corporate doctrine might  impose 
the values of altruism and cooperation . Given a relational approach, 
a legal decisionmaker would ins tead employ a normative model in­
corporating the individualistic values of discrete contracting, avoid­
ing doctrine buil t  on entity concep tions . 
A relational approach , however, results in quick and clear nor­
mative s ignals only when confronting neatly hypothesized firms and 
issues . In more complicated real world s i tuations ,  it serves the 
lesser (but st i l l  s ignificant) function of delineating normative i s sues 
more clearly .  Viewing the real world management corporation rela­
tionally, with due regard to the new economic theory ' s  conceptions ,  
i t  represents a complex of contracts , some discrete and some rela­
tional . Corporate doctrine does not conclus ively fix the appropriate 
characterization of even the more common contracts ;  s tock and 
bond ownership may appear both ways , given public trading mar­
kets . The holder enters a relationship with the firm through a dis­
crete contract .  The holder can exit through a discrete contract. 
Therefore, norms appropriate for discrete contracts may plausibly 
govern the holder's relationship to the other participants in the 
firm . 1 0"' On the other hand, the focus of the picture of the s tock and 
bondholders ' rela tionship to the rest of the corporation can shift 
from the individual s tock or bondholder to encompass the entire 
group of security holders . The moment this shift to the "entity" 
occurs , relational values spring from the contract .  Conflicts arise 
between discrete and relational aspects of other intrafirm contracts ,  
especially the employment terms of i ts  managers and employees .  
Corporate doctrine, in operation,  hedges between the relationships'  
discrete and relational aspects ,  allcYwing the determination of the 
dominant model to depend on concrete fact patterns . 
1 0·1  Such a transpos i t i o n .  hm1T\Cf, m�n cr lC.T\ a t c  a n d  d i s t o rt t he ne11· cconomrc 
theory.  
I 0 :> Sre i\L D.-\ N - C o w: r-.: ,  sujJm n o t e � .  at 2-t (consi d era t i o ns o! '  s e l f� i n t eres t can argue 
agai n s t  act ive  part ic ipat ion in the i n t ern a l  cl c c i s i o n making o f  an orga n i z a t i o n ) ; A .  
H r RS C I ! M.\1\' ,  ExrT, V o i C E  A'\D LoYALTY ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  
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Enhanced relational sensi tivity in corporate law would not  make 
these normative decisions easier. I t  would introduce no formulaic 
solutions for general acceptance and application .  Instead, it would 
bestow the doctrine with the heightened awareness that resul ts from 
a formal admission that the s i tuation i s  ambiguous.  It thereby 
would permit a range of theoretical conceptions of firms (and asso­
ciated legal approaches) to bear on the contracting behavior of par­
ticular parties and particular types of businesses .  It a l so would 
accord theoretical sanction to the coexis tence of different corporate 
l aw approaches-entity-based approaches presupposing h igh de­
grees of interdependence, 1 06 and aggregate-based approaches mod­
elled on the arms length sale of goods contract .  All firms would be 
recognized as entities , but group-based norms would apply in  given 
instances with intensit ies varying with the particular transacting 
patterns .  
I I I  
T H E  NEXUS O F  CONTRACTS AND THE POLITI CAL ECONOMY 
OF THE CoRPORATE FIRM 
The nexus of contracts assertion has a political aspect .  The as­
sertion matches the firm's  economic substance with individual actors 
and their respective contracts and classifies the firm's  s tate created 
components as fictions . The assertion thereby suggests  l imits on 
the state's legitimate role in the corporate firm' s  l ife .  
This Part critically appraises this political component .  Firs t ,  i t  
juxtaposes politics of the  new economic theory with the  wider range 
of current theory respecting the rela tions of the corporation and the 
s tate .  This exercise shows that the new economic theorists have 
miss tated materially the political issue underlying corporate law. 
They frame the i s sue as an absolute choice between the firm as a 
contract and the firm as a concession of sovereign authori ty .  I n  fact ,  
concession concepts are outmoded . More flexible,  and enduring 
concepts inform contemporary jurisprudence of an anti-managerial 
and proregulatory disposit ion. The new theoris ts '  picture of abso­
lute political rights and wrong·s dissolves upon restating the issue in 
terms of the public or private heuris tic long prevalent in  theoretical 
discourse of the political s tatus of the firm . In the "public-private" 
framework, political questions become matters of degree resolved 
according to variant political dispositions of different observers . 
Second, the discussion draws on corporate doctrine for an al­
ternative approach to the poli tics of corporate law. The theories 
I 0( i  See Knau s s .  CmjJorate CnFerllrlllrf-.·1 .\IO<'I II/2, Tmget , 79 M I C H .  L. R Ev.  4 78, 490. 
496-99 ( 1 98 1 )  (associ a t i o n  o f  i n tense fi duciarv chHies with e n t i t v  no t ions) . 
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jockey against each other to advance their respective state or indi­
vidual perspectives . Corporate doctrine, in  contrast ,  moves more 
flexibly.  It declares a l imit  on freedom of contract within corpora­
tions .  Beyond that, it incorporates an open-ended view of state-cor­
porate relations ,  faci l i tating an ongoing poli tical accommodation 
between the collective interests manifes ted by the s tate and the indi­
vidual interests of  contracting part ies .  
A .  Contract or Concess ion 
1 .  The Nexus of Contracts versus Concession Theory 
Commentary grounded in the nexus of contracts concept de­
clares "contract or concess ion" to be the political issue regarding 
the theory of the firm. 1 07 It  asserts that advocates of government 
regulation subscribe to a concession theory of the corporation ' s  ori­
gin 1 0�'� and then draws on the nexus of contracts to rebu t  concession 
theorv .  
This commentary renders concession theory as fol lows :  The 
corporation is  a creature of the s tate .  The s tate gives the corpora­
tion l ife and concedes to it the special privileges of enti ty status ,  
perpetual existence , and l imited l iabil i ty . 1 00 In exchange , corporate 
actors owe services to the public good.  The s tate must regulate cor­
porations to enforce this obl igation to reciprocate. Concession the­
ory appears together with entity conceptions of the corporation,  1 1 0 
and with organicist  conceptions of community interes ts . 1 1 1 
The nexus of contracts assertion rebuts this picture of conces­
s ion theory. The contractual firm comprises voluntarily associating 
sovereign individuals .  They enjoy no special s tate privilege. In­
s tead, they exercise their individual right to contract. The contrac­
tual corporation pursues no public purpose dictated by virtue of its 
creation , i t  pursues the private purposes of contracting part ies . 1 1 :! 
Given a firm entity reduced to a contentless reference point ,  noth­
ing of substance remains for the s tate to add by concess ion to these 
contracts . 
This neat argument w ins some points , but i t  fai ls  to win any 
points worth making.  No one advocates the theory it rebuts . A half-
I 07 The " debate' '  is most lv a figment of the imagina t ion  of Robert Hessen .  Set' 1 11{m 
notes l 08- l � and accompam ing text. 
I OH See R.  HESSEN,  I N  D HENSE or TH E C O RPOR.·\TI O N  3-33 ( 1 979) ; Hessen. ,·1 .\'ecu 
Conapt of Cmpumtions: . ..J Contmrtua( anrf Pm•alr Pmjm ly .\ fnc!tl. 30 HASTI NGS L J .  1 327 ,  
! 3�7-28 ( !  979) ; Kannel ,  The lndrpendm t  Cmpomte Board: _-J .\ !eons t o  ll' hat End�. 5� CEo.  
WASIL  L. Res. 534 .  5 3 5  ( 1 984 ) .  
I 0� 1  
I I 0 
I l l  
I 1 :!  
Hessen , .111jlm note  108, at  1 32 7 . 1 330 .  
R o m a n o ,  .\ fetapnfil!rs a n d  Cmpomte Law Htjimn , 36 ST,\N .  L REv.  9� :\ . 933 ( 1 984 ) .  
!d. a t  933-34 .  
!d a 1  93:1 -34 
434 CORNELL LA W REVIE W [Vol . 74:407 
century has elapsed s ince advocates of government regulation of 
corporations emphasized concess ion theory . S trangely, i t s  recent 
resurrection as a foi l  for the new economic theory has passed into 
the discourse without cri t ici sm . 1 1 3 No one, however, seems to s tep 
forward to jo in the debate actively on the concession s ide .  M ean­
while, the unchallenged presence of this one-sided argument ob­
scures the new economic theory' s  pol itical vulnerabi l i ties . The 
fol lowing discussion clarifies the p lace of concession theory by out­
lining its  his tory and showing its disappearance as a focal point of 
American corporate law discourse .  
2 .  The Historical Decline of Concession Theory 
The new economic theoris ts correctly recognize that the basic 
doctrinal assertion of concession theory i s  that corporations must 
derive positive authori ty from the s tate . 1 1 4 Sovereigns have asserted 
this requirement in  different guises since Roman times ,  1 1 5 in  order 
to suppress  potential rival agglomerations of power. 1 H> Signifi ­
cantly , no sovereign in the Engl ish speaking world has asserted con­
cession theory with complete success for several centurie s .  From 
the sixteenth until the eighteenth century, the British government 
maintained that only the s tate could create an artificial person.  But 
the lawyers of the time, like today ' s  new economic theori s t s ,  resis ted 
departures from the scheme of natural persons in private dealings 
and advanced an opposing contractual conception of the firm . They 
circumvented concession doctrine by devising s tructures for the 
conduct of business affairs , such as the trust  and the jo int  s tock com­
pany , 1 1 7 that worked without sovereign participation . 1 1 s  
In the United S tates , concess ion theory enjoyed vital i ty during 
the firs t half of the nineteenth century . This was the special charter 
1 1 :1 See, e.g. , M .  D A N - C O H E N ,  supm note � .  a t  200; Fischel ,  C01pora te Covema nce , supra 
note 5 ,  a t  1 27 3  n .44 ; Karmel , supm note 1 06.  a t  535 n . 5 ;  Romano,  supm note  1 08 ,  a t  933-
35 ;  1[ Frug,  supra note �3 .  a t  l �W5-06 n . 8 2 ,  1 307 n .90 (correct ly  no t ing  tha t  H essen 
revives a n ineteenth century perspect i ve) . 
I 1 4 See Dewev, supra note 7 3 .  a t  66(); V inogradofl, supra note I ,  a t  600-0 I .  
1 1 5 R .  SAVIGNY, J u RA L  R E LATI O N S  § 88 (W Ratt igan  trans .  1 888 ) ;  R .  S o H M ,  THE I N ­
STITUTES § 38 IJ Led l ic  trans .  1 940 ) . 
I I � >  Dewev, supm note 73 ,  a t  666: \'inogradoff. supra note I ,  at 600-0 1 .  
I 1 7 See Jacobson ,  The Pnva/e Csr of Publir .-i uthonty: Srnnngnty and "-i.oS0(/(1/ion.\ Iii the 
Common Law . 29 B u FFALO L. Rn-. 599,  G44-GO ( 1 980 ) .  Parl iament tr ied to p u t  a s top to  
the jo in t-stock company wi th  the Bubble  Act  of 1 7�0 which forbade the transfer of  
shares in  jo in t  s tock companies .  Src zd. a t  G6� . 
I 1 S Bri t i sh lawvers enjoved such success that  bv 1 800 partnerships and j o i n t  stock 
companies were as much u t i l ized as \·ch icles for the rai s ing of cap i ta l  as  special lv 
chartered corpora tions .  During the  e ighteeth centurv .  the Brit ish parl iament on1v 
chartered some half dozen corporat ions fo r  manufacturing.  Sre Handl in  & Hand l in ,  On­
gzns of !hr . lmnzrrnz Buszness Cmporalwll , in Pt iBLI C: PoLICY A N D  THE 1\.I o n E R N  C o R PORATI 0 0:  
5-6 (D .  Grunewald & H.  Bass  eels. 1 9G6) .  
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phase of  American corporate his tory , during which concession the­
ory accurately described the practice of corporate creation . It circu­
lated in tandem with the " legal fiction" conception of the nature of 
the firm; 1 1 9 the early n ineteenth century corporation was an entity 
that was a s tate-created reification . But public law premises of 
corporateness  fai led to achieve absolute adherence even during this 
period .  Contractual notions of corporateness also circulated, as the 
most famous corporate law case of the time, Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward 1 20 demonstrates .  
Concession theory lost  i ts  vital ity as general incorporation laws 
proliferated . Once equal and substantially free access to the corpo­
rate form became the norm, 1 2 1 the notion of "concess ion" no 
longer described the practice of incorporation . The doctrine de­
clined gradually; the s tate continued to figure into corporate crea­
t ion, and the doctrine continued to appear in law books . 1 22 
By the time the dispute between reali s ts and anti-real is ts  was 
resolved during the late 1 920s ,  the consti tutive imagery of conces­
sion theory no longer made practical sense .  The only corporate 
doctrine supporting concession theory was the requirement of fil ing 
with the s tate .  To twentieth century observers this  was a technical­
ity. States incorporated businesses as a ministerial matter;  they did 
I 1 9 See Dewey, supra note 7 3 ,  at 6 6 7  - 6 8 ;  Vino gradoff, supra note 1 ,  a t  600. 
1 2 0 1 7  U . S .  (4 Whea t . )  5 1 8 . () 36 ( 1 8 1 9) .  For d i s c u s s i o n  of t h i s  case 's  p l ace i n  the 
h i s tory o f  theory of the firm, sec Note,  The Person ification of t h e  Business Corporat10n 1n ,-! men­
can Law, 54 U .  CHI.  L. R Ev .  ! -H I ,  l 4 .f 7 - 5 5  ( 1 98 7 )  
1 2 1 See Horw i t z ,  supra n o te l .  at 1 8 1 ,  1 84 ;  Horwitz ,  l'l1e Hist01y of thr Public/ Prwate 
Distinction ,  1 30 U. PA . L. R EV .  1 4 � 3 .  1 4 2 5  ( 1 98 2 )  [ h ereinafter Horw i t z ,  Publir/Prwatf] . 
I :? �  \'V i th  no sovereign act ive ly  assert ing i t  i n  accordance \Vi t h  i t s  or iginal  purpose,  
concession theorv fel l  into m a n i p u l a t i n g  hands in  the complex o f  l a t e  n i neteenth centurv 
corporate law discuss ions .  From one perspect ive,  conces s i o n  theo ry s upported ex­
panded managemen t power.  If the corporate form was a conces s i o n  of author i tv ,  now 
i n vested by means of the m i n i s terial act  of  s tale i n corporat ion u n d e r  t h e  general i ncor­
pora t ion s t a t u t e s ,  then the s ta t e  conceded q u i t e  a bit o f authori tv .  D e\'.:ey,  supra note 7 3 ,  
a t  667-68.  Because t h e  corpora t i o n  was o n l v  a " l egal  fic t ion , "  i ts i n d i v i d u a l  i nt eres t 
holders had cognizable r ights  avai lable for s i m u l taneous assert ion a ga i n s t  government  
regulat ion fro m  outs ide of b u s iness corpora t i o n  l a w .  Concess ion theory a lso figured 
i n t o  the d ebate between rea l is ts and ant i -real is ts  over the n a t u re o f  the firm. Here con­
cession t heory was turned aga i n s t  managem ent  bv a n ti-manageri a l i s t  i n d i v i d ua l i s t s .  
Viewed i n  t h e  a b s trac t ,  a conces s i o n  theorv of  corporate o r i g i n  opposes b o t h  the a n t i ­
real i s t s '  contra c tual  concep t i o n  a n d  rea l i s t s '  n a t u ra l  e n t i t v  concep t i o n .  U n l i ke conces­
sion theory, both of these approaches ach·ance the n o t ion that the corpora t i o n  i s  a nor­
m a l  and natural  mode of doing b u s i ness rat h er than a special  pr iv i lege.  The managerial  
in teres t s  found real ism t h e  most congenial  a l ternat ive  . .  -\s mas ters o f  the real e n t i t ies 
they s tood to gain to  t h e  ext ent  that  the rca l i � t  theon produced rights fo r corporate 
persons.  I nd i vi d u a l i s ts uncomfortable  with managerial  bu reaucrat ic  po1ver-centers 
countered by em braci n g  the o l d  conces s i o n  and art i fi c i a l  e n t i t v  doctr ines .  'v\' h i l c  enta i l ­
ing s o m e t h i n g  less  than a regime o r  absolute  free con t rac t ,  these doctr ines  a t  least  
shared t h e  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  methodological  prenllSc that  t h e  i n cl i\·i cl u a l  i s  t h e  s tJ rt i n g  p o i n t  
of l egal and pol i t ical  theon. SN' Horw i t z  . .  \ 1/jJm n o t e  I .  at  I 7 9 - 8 3 .  Compou n d i n g· t h e  
i r o n v ,  ant i - ind i\ · idua l i s t  social i s t s  j o i ned 11· i th  manageri a l i s t s  in  embra c i n g  real i s m .  
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not "breathe l ife" in to  them. As Be:rle explained, were the law to  
decree that the corporations no longer existed,  they would carry on 
anyway. 1 23 Incorporating s tates no longer endowed businesses  with 
sovereignty. 1 2-l In  practice, corporations operated by means of con­
tract and agency relat ionship s .  Certainly management hierarchies 
exercised unilateral power, but  s tate action was not involved . 
Although reified rather than real to twentieth century tas te ,  the cor­
poration no longer appeared the s tate-created " legal fict ion" of the 
early nineteenth century . The observers looked at the practice and 
traced the reification to the firm 's  human participants . 1 25 Twentieth 
century corporate doctrine reflects these underlying conceptions . 1 26 
B .  The Firm According t o  M id-Twentieth Century Anti­
Manageriali s ts : The Publ ic  Product of  Sovereign 
Coercion 
1 .  The Publlc-Private Distinction and the i\1anagement Corporation 
Discussions of sovereign involvement in corporate l i fe contin­
ued after concession theory disappeared.  These discuss ions cen­
tered on theories about the public or private nature of insti tutions . 
These theories achieved prominence in American legal thinking in 
the nineteenth century . 1 2 7  They manifest  a l iberal individual i s t  
pol i tical outlook. This perspective exalts neutrality with respect  to 
individual visions of the good, maximum autonomy for each individ­
ual ,  and s trict l imi tations on social obl igations to achieve the mini­
mum necessary for social cooperation . 1 2�' The law serves the ideal 
1 2 �� A .  BER LE , supra note 20 ,  at 1 8 . 
1 24 See I A. DEWING , supm note 8 1 ,  at I I ( real is t ic cr i t ique of the components of  
concession doctrine ) . Dewing o ffers two broader theoretical jus t i ficat ions for conces­
s ion doctrine. Firs t ,  the sovereign art icula tes the common purposes of the corporat ion ' s  
const i tuen t  parties.  !d. This jus t i ficat ion .  of  course, was  as  anachronist ic  as  the  doc­
tr ine.  The state had withdrawn from the business of  contributing  concepts to governing 
corporate documents with the spread of general i ncorporation .  Second,  the  s tate exer­
cises final  control i n  a l l  relat ionships of i t s  inhabi tants ,  irl. a t  1 2 ,  but this  serves less as a 
just ification for concess ion doctrine  than as the theoret ical impetus behind the assser­
tion that the corporat ion is  "publ ic" ra ther than "priva te ."  See infra text acc01npam·ing 
notes 1 30-4 1 .  
1 2 0 Srr supra text accompanving note 1 1 2 .  
1 2 ti As an example ,  consider the post-war prol iferat ion of contractua l modi fica t ions  
of  the structures of c lose corporat ions .  Srr f!.PIII'm//y O ' Nea l .  .\ folding; thf' CmjJomte For111 to 
Particular Businfss Situation.\: OjJ!IIInal (.'/f(lrtfr Uau.\1'.1 , 1 0  \'.-\ :-.J D .  L. REv. I ( 1 956) . Sn' also 
Bratton,  Book Revie1v, 1 985  D t ' K E  L J .  2 cl 7 .  2 5 5-59 (rev iewing R .  HA M I LT O !\ ,  C o R PORA­
T I O N  FINANC E :  CASES A N D  l\LITERI.-\LS ( l 9S-f ) ) .  
1 2 7 H orwitz, Public/Pnuatl', supra note 1 2 1 .  at 1 42 3 .  
I 2 H  See Rosenfeld ,  Con tmrl rmd jus/zre: The R!'lotzon BelwPI'Il Classzml Con/me/ !JW' and 
Soria/ Contract TlzNJI�l'. 70 I0\1'.\ L. RH. 7G0.  772 .  794-95 ( 1 98 5 ) . These 1 a lues lead l iberal 
indiv idual ists to seek l im i tat ions on state pOII'(T. One principal  theoretical means to this 
end is to employ the natural rights idea f irst e labor:ned in the seventeen th century. Sn· 
H orwi tz ,  Publlr/Pnc'ale, supm note 1 2 1 .  at l 4 2 c) .  
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b y  providing rights to protect private matters . 
Corporate doctrine took on a private cast by the turn of the 
century. This shift brought the practical effect of endowing corpo­
rate managers with insulation from government oversigh t  under the 
business judgment principle .  Anti-managerial ists challenged this 
protected s tatus on public-private grounds .  The commentary began 
with Berle and Means and intensified after the Second World 
War. l 29 
Post war anti-managerialists argued that management corpora­
tions-termed "public corporations"-had a public character that 
jus tifies regulation . The argument appears in both extreme and 
moderate versions . In the extreme version corporate law privatized 
the firm between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid- twentieth 
century . 1 30 But the received, private picture mis takenly rests on 
doctrinally-based conceptions of private property.  Shifting eyes 
away from doctrine and to a functional view, a public entity appears 
along with the power, impact, and control of  corporations . Corpo­
rations , in substance, amount to "private governments . "  1 3 1  Fur­
thermore, proof of public character i l lustrates the "need" for 
accountabil ity .  Democratic models from poli tical s cience provide 
bases for reform . 1 32 This  presentation acknowledges concession 
theory but relegates it  to a role subordinate to corporate "public­
nes s" ;  i t  figures in only as a favorable his torical antecedent .  1 33 More 
1 2�) The "publ ic ' '  theme figured in to doctrinal fai rness j urisprudence as wel l  as pol ­
icv debates . See S tone,  Cmporate T 'ices and Cmporate / 'irtues: D o  Pub/ic/Pm•ate Dlsll llclwns 
.\faller?,  1 30 U. PA . L. REv. 1 44 1 ,  1 449 ,  1 480 ( 1 98 2 ) .  A publ ic  model of  corporations 
impl ies s t rict  scrut iny of the behavior of corporate managers in  matters affect ing the 
in terests of investors .  Corporate doctrine, however, fo l lows the trust model i n  name 
only .  I n  practice, i t  l eaves substantial  room for se lf- in terested conduct bv corporate 
managers . 
l 30 See Dahl ,  Couern111g the Cwn t  Cmpomtio n ,  in CoRPORATE PowER I N  AMERICA 1 2  ( R .  
Nader & M .  Green eels .  1 97 2 ) .  
I �� 1 See R .  NADER. j .  SELIGMAN & M .  GREEN ,  .wpm note  9 ,  at  I ,  7 ;  Dahl ,  supra note  1 30 .  
a t  2 ; Friedmann. Cmporate Power, Govern/lien/ by Priz•ate CroujJs, a n d  the Law. 5 7  CoLl'l\t .  L.  
R E V .  1 55 ,  1 76 ( 1 95 7 ) ;  Latham, supra note  24 ,  at  2 2 0 .  
Observers sympathetic w i th  the  new economic theorv a l so confirm tha t  the " publ ic  
or  pr ivate" quest ion is the leading contemporarv corporate law issue .  See Winter,  The 
Deuelopment of the Law of Cmpomte Couema n ce.  9 DEL. .J . CoRP.  L. 524,  52.5-26 ( 1 98 4 ) .  
1 :-3 2 Since thev  perceived the  fi rm as  pub l i c  and  pol i t ica l ,  they appl ied current pol i t­
ical theories respect ing government to t h e  fi rm.  The analyt ica l  framework of in terest 
group p l ural ism prevalent during the post-war period came to bear on mat ters of  corpo­
rate governance pol icy .  C/ Hon,· i tz .  Pub/ir/Pm •a/1', mjJm note 1 2 1 ,  a t  1 42 7 .  
1 :>:I The anti-manageria l i s ts supported their pub l i r  and  pol i t ical  assert ions wi th  a h i s ­
torical s tory: 
In the beginning,  in  the earlv n i neteenth c e n t u n .  corporate formation was a mat ter 
of special  chartering bv state l e g i s la t u res .  In  Lhose clavs . legal doctrine treated corporate 
power lcga l l v  as a concession of s o 1·ereign t 1· .  Thus,  before 1 830  corporat ions were 
"chips off the block of sovereigntv , "  R. 1'\ADER . j .  St.t . IGI'vt.-\1' & M. GREEN.  supra note 9,  at 
3 3 - 3 7 ,  and bodies created to "obtain pub l ic  ends . "  !rl at 62-63 ;  sff also Latham, supra 
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moderate commentators restructure the argument . 1 34 Corporations 
remain on the private s ide of the l ine, but  represent private law crea­
tures in which the public has an interest aris ing from funct ional con­
s iderations .  But these functional considerations have a pol i ti cally 
neutral cas t ,  such as protecting reasonable expectations and maxi­
mizing efficiency . 1 35 When the functional considerat ions combine 
so as to legi timate government intervention in the case of  " publ ic" 
corporations , the certificate of incorporation has "consti tut ional" as 
well  as "contractual" implications . 1 30 Again concess ion theory 
figures in only as an his torical phenomenon . 1 37 
2 .  Sovereign Coercion Theory 
Broader theories of sovereign involvement in  private contract 
inform the anti-managerial arguments .  These theories began with 
legal real is ts l ike Morris Cohen 1 38 and Robert Hale, 1 39 and survive 
in the post-real i s t  writings of H .L .A .  Hart 1 40 and Hans Kelsen . 1 4 1 
These theories conjoin the government and the contract through 
sovereign enforcement of private contracts .  The private market 
represents an artifact of " public violence . "  1 42 Contractual arrange­
ments always entail sovereign commands and, therefore, are never 
ful ly private . S tating the point more expansively, the necessi ty of 
publ ic enforcement makes contract a "delegation"  of " coercive 
note 24 ,  at  222-23 .  Then, during the course of  the nineteenth century, special  charter­
ing  waned and disappeared as a means to the end of promoting equal access to the  
corporate form . Unfortunately ,  dark forces took  control around the  turn  o f  the  century .  
S ta tes ceded l egal control to management groups in  exchange for tax  do l lars .  These 
bad fai th  transact ions permit ted corporations to escape their h istorical duty to serve 
publ ic  ends, even as corporations cont inued to derive their  const i tuent and legi t imat ing 
power from the s tate and to share i ts sovereignty .  See Latham, supra , a t  223;  see generally 
Jacobson, supm note 1 1 7 . 
I 34 The anti-manageria l i s ts a lso differed on mat ters of detai l .  Thev d iffered on the 
select ion of  the in terest groups ent i t led to part ic ipate in  corporate governance. Techni­
cal  quest ions a lso came up about means of  ach ieving representat ion.  They he ld di ffer­
en t  opinions about the degree of control on management discretion actua l ly  exercized 
by market forces and other inst i tu t ional cons traints ,  and made accord ingl y  d i fferent rec­
ommendations of  necessary degrees of l egal control of  management. See A .  B E R LE ,  supra 
note 20,  at 58-60. 
I :E> See Eisenberg, supra note 3 ,  at 588 .  
l 'I G  Ratner, Co1porallons and the Consl ! lu/1011 , 1 5  U.S .F .  L. REv.  1 1 , 2 ! ,  2 7  ( 1 980-8 1 ) ; see 
a lso ivl . EISENBERG,  mJna note 82 ,  at I .  
1 3 7 Ratner, supra note 1 36 ,  at 1 9-20 ;  Eisenberg, supm note 3 .  at 588 .  
I 3 H See M .  CoHEN,  PROPERTY AND SO\'EREIGNTY .. \ND T i l E  BAsEs OF CoNTRACT LAw AND 
THE SOCIAL ORDER 4 1 ,  69,  1 02 ( 1 938) . 
I :l ' l  See Hale, Coemon and Dls!nbu/1011 1 11 a Supposedly .\'on-Coemc•e Stale, 38  PoL. S c i .  Q 
4 70 ( 1 92 3 )  
1 40 H .L. A.  HART, THE CoNCEPT or LAw 7 7-96 ( l 9G l ) . 
I l l H .  KELSEN ,  PURE THEORY OF L\W § �  36-40 ( 1 96 7 ) .  
1 42 See Kennedv. The Stages of !he Decline of the Public I Pric •a/e Dlslll lri!0/1 , 1 30 U .  PA. L .  
REv .  1 349 .  1 352  ( 1 982 )  (reviewing Hale .  supra note ! 39 ) .  
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power" to  individuals .  1 4 3 Contracting becomes " legislation" i 44-a 
public event .  As the public coloration of the particular contract be­
comes more intense, the argument that the delegated coercive 
power should be publicly accountable becomes more persuasive. 1 4 5  
The management corporation represents , of course ,  the  mos t  color­
ably public of all private contracts . 
Extreme s tatements of this theory of sovereignty in contract re­
semble concession theory by asserting that the sovereign delegates 
in theory and the delegation justifies sovereign intervention in busi­
ness relationships in practice. But concession theory and sovereign 
coercion theory are materially different .  Concession theory employs 
a crude and absolute concept of delegation.  The delegation trans­
forms the business arrangement ;  the transformed business owes al l  
of i ts  many essential parts to the sovereign. Sovereign coercion the­
ory recognizes a more complex real ity and settles for considerably 
less sovereign involvement.  Al though every contractual rela tionship 
threatens sovereign coercion,  this fact  results only in  a diminution 
of the private arrangement ' s  claim to voluntarines s .  I t  denies 
neither freedom of contract nor the obviously individual aspects of 
contractual arrangements categorically .  
Sovereign coercion theory pleases pol itical moderates by al­
lowing them to identify s i tuations of meaningful  voluntariness re­
quiring no reform. Within the theory, they need only look at the 
contractual relationship in practice and ascertain whether the actors 
involved bel ieve i t  to be voluntary and remain largely unconscious 
of or unconcerned with the sovereign coercion entai led.  Actors in 
many s i tuations partake of this largely unal ienated consciousness .  
Concession theory ,  once applied to a contractual relat ionship, does 
not anticipate these practical moments of free contract .  This results 
in  both i ts  general implausibil ity and its at tractiveness to enthusiasts 
of the new economic theory looking for easy anti-s tatis t  theoretical 
victories . The sovereign coercion assertion, in contrast ,  does not 
admit of flat refutation.  The state's presence is undeniable .  
C .  The Firm According to New Economic Theoris t s :  The 
Private Product of Consenting Actors 
1 .  The Private Firm 
The new economic theory brings unmitigated l iberal individual­
ism back to corporate legal theory. The nexus of contracts assertion 
1 4 �  M. CoHEN, supm note 1 38 ,  at  4 1 .  69,  1 02 ;  see H o r w i t z ,  Public/Private. supra note 
1 2 1 ,  at  1 426 .  
1 4 4  Jacobson, supra note 1 1 7 , a t  605-06. 
1 4 .'1 Kennedy, supm note 1 42 ,  at ! 35 1 -5 2 .  
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s imultaneously reinforces the publ ic-private distinction and pul ls  
the corporation to the private s ide .  I t  counters decades of  ant i ­
managerial ist  writing, inviting us  to wring the tort out of our con­
cept of corporate law and to reconstruct the concept on a consen­
sual bas is .  
Liberal individuali sm appears boldly in the neoclass ic i s t s '  pic­
ture of the firm . Their contentless nexus of contracts formed by 
rational economic actors approximates Hayek's  " spontaneous or­
der . "  I -IG  In Hayek's pol i ti cal v is ion,  individuals pursuing their own 
ends effect successful social orders . Ins titutions function without 
del iberate design by higher powers and sovereigns need not  impose 
directives on individual s .  The neoclass ici s ts bring this v is ion of so­
cial order to the management corporation,  carrying the concept 
even further than Hayek did . 1 -1 7 Their contractual firm i s  spontane­
ous, aris ing from the contracts of  free economic actors rather than 
through the p lanning of hierarchically p laced superiors . The actors 
pursue their own interes ts within each discrete contractual arrange­
ment. Yet a larger, integrally functioning mechanism emerges from 
the atomistic conduct. The necessary cohesion springs fro m  the re­
sourcefulness and evaluative capaci ty of the cons tantly contracting 
participants . 1 -1 s No higher authori ty or  intell igence establ ishes a 
" purpose" or imposes duties entai l ing subordination of  individual 
purposes . 
The notion of spontaneous order is  new to the theory of  the 
firm. More tradi tional firm contractual i sm perceives the parties as 
the s ource of energy, but also recognizes the consti tutive function of  
p lanning. For example, the ins titutional new economic theoris ts  
recognize s tructure, h ierarchy, and p lanning but they erect i t  on a 
contractual cons titution . 1 -19 Since the s tructures are means to 
achieve cost reduction , the s tate has no formative role to play; i t  
possesses no more expert ise at cost reduction than the contracting 
parties themselves . 1 50 Thus the firm i s  "private ."  
2 .  The Actors · Consent 
The new economic theory implicit ly rebuts sovereign coercion 
theory . Sovereign enforcement manifes tly exis ts ,  but sovereign en-
I -I G See I F. H.-\YH, LAW, LEG I S L\TION AND L I B E RTY : RULES A:--;D O R D E R  2. I I , 289 
( 1 97 3 ) . To Havek, the mere exis tence of  an ins t i tu t ion provides evidence that it was 
created to  achieve human purposes . 
1 -1 7 H ayek v iews corporat ions as "organ izat ions ' '-ins t i tu t ions d is t inct  from sponta­
neous orders . See id. 
1 -I H  See l'vleckl ing.  supm note 3 8 ,  a t  550 (contras t ing the v is ion of man a s  a rat ional  
economic actor wi th that  of  economis ts  who ad\'ocate planning) . 
1 -I � J See supm notes 59-68 and accompanying tex t .  
I :)0 See Wil l iamson,  supm note 68,  a t  36 1 .  
IF 
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forcement occurs legitimately only when people want enforce­
ment .  1 5 1 So long as the contracting parties consent, sovereign 
enforcement of contracts presents no theoretical problem. The eco­
nomic actors of the new economic theory-both the neoclassical 
and the inst itutional cas ts-make all  requis i te consents . 
Professor Anthony Kronman , writing in the ins titutional i s t  
vein ,  1 52 advances the consent point several s teps further and 
equates all techniques of contract enforcement, private and sover­
e ign .  They are s imilar in kind b ecause the process of cost  reduction 
generates them all .  S ince s tate mechanisms provide the lowest cost 
enforcement mechanisms in many s ituations ,  s tate intervention is 
jus tifiable .  If  the s tate did not exi s t ,  contracting parties presumably 
would invent i t  in their effort to reduce lower cost s . 1 53 This view of 
the s tate as a cost reducing agency equates the firm and the s tate,  
according them a common const i tut ional essence. The l egi timacy of 
both rests on contract ;  the " governed" want more weal th, and their 
rationality allows the assumption of their consent to cost  reductive 
insti tutions . 
Oddly, this ins titutional ist  cos t-reductive conception of the 
s ta te resembles the concession theory of centuries ago . Under both ,  
no fundamental differences exi s t  between the nature of  the legiti­
mate corporation and of the legitimate s tate . The ins titutional i s t  
theory differs , of course ,  in locating the analysis in private rather 
than public quarters , and in contract rather than posi tive law. 
3.  Summary 
Insti tutional is ts and neoclass icists employ different pol i tical 
s trategies to a s imilar end . Neoclassicists refashion the firm in bold 
outl ines to anchor i ts immovable  location on the private s ide of the 
public-private divide. In so doing they recons truct the firm to elimi­
nate the phenomena on which anti-managerial ists rely in  call ing the 
firm public .  The insti tutional i s ts admit the exis tence of many "pub­
l ic" phenomena. They advance the case for privatization ,  however, 
by refashioning the public-private divide .  Less formali s t  than the 
neoclassicis ts ,  they present a gray area of mixed elements,  recon­
s tructing our thinking so as to highlight the contractual and the pri­
vate in what otherwise appears public. Carried to its ult imate 
conclusion, their perspective makes cos t-reductive contractualism 
the essence of all sovereign and individual in teraction respecting 
l ,-, l Srt Jacobson,  sujJm no te 1 1 7 , at 0 1 2- 1  :) (describ ing sovereign tv as merelv a " pre­
text to suppress and control the energv of persons " ) .  
l :) 2 Sfe Kronman, supra note I 03 , at 28 .  
l :) :� !d. 
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business relationships . I "4 
D .  Political Theories of the Firm and Corporate Doctrine 
1 .  Public and Private Conjoined 
Theories that separate the world into public and private ele­
ments offer two plausible and ins tructive p ictures . One sees the 
world as a complex of contracts ;  the other sees i t  as delegated sover­
eign authori ty. Nei ther depict ion, however, i s  wholly accurate. Pub­
l ic  and private elements s imultaneously pervade the l ives of most  
persons and inst i tut ions .  Freedom of contract i s  freedom to ask the 
sovereig·n to confer power constraining your freedom on another 
party. At the same time, contract cannot exis t where sovereign con­
trol i s  complete; i t  requires some minimum of individual auton­
omyY ' "  In theory, market and pol itical environments may b e  
dis tinguished, 1 56 b u t  in  practice they intermix. Just a s  one may view 
markets as erections upon sovereign coercive power, so  one may 
v1ew government bureaucracies as operating on contractual 
norms . 1 57 An individual i s t  observer may see recent his tory in terms 
of government imposing public duties on private parties . 1 5s At the 
same time, a collectivi s t  may see the same his tory as a fall  from the 
belief in  a distinctively public realm s tanding above private self  in­
terest .  1 5� 1 Yet both make legitimate observations . 1 t>o 
1 54 This cos t-red uctive contract u a l i s m  is u t i l i tarian in n a ture.  Under I t ,  weal th  crea­
tion is consonant with i n dividual  freedom because people \Va n t  i t  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  are 
j us tified to  the ex tent t h a t  thev i ncrease wea l t h .  B u t  one wonders how i n s ti tu t i o n a l i s t s  
w o u l d  respond to a r e a l  world c a s e  i n  w h i ch p e o p l e  d i d  n o t  wish to  t a k e  a d v a n tage o f  a 
cost- reductive i n s t i t u t i o n .  Perhaps they believe that  such cases do n o t  exi s t  a n d  t h a t  
h u m a n  freedom a n d  cost  red uction are ent irely  harmonious i n  p ractice.  
The contractua l i s m  of t h e  neoclassicists  has a more deontol ogica l character.  They 
most l i kely bel ieve human freedom to be worth protecting fo r i ts  own sake.  O f  course 
thev a lso belie\·e that  rational  economic actors reach efficient res u l t s  i f  l e ft a l o n e .  B u t  
one wonders which t h e y  w o u l d  choose i n  cases where wea l t h  is better p ro d uced bv c o l ­
lect ive endeavor t h a n  b v  se l f�in terested p u r s u i t  of  individual  e n d s .  O n e  s u pects  t h a t  
t h e y  would escape t h i s  deontological- u t i l i tarian tension b y  deconstructing t h e  proferred 
c o l l ective endeavor and reco n s truct ing i t  i n  terms of individual  purs u i t s .  
! 5 5 See i\1acnei l ,  supm n o te 89,  a t  368-69. 
l 5ti See S tone,  supra n o te 1 29 ,  at 1 44 5-56.  
1 ">7 Macnei l  iden tifies contractual  re lat ionships  within as w e l l  as outs ide of govern­
ment.  See, e.g. , Macnei l ,  Burmurrary, Liberalism and Comnuuu ty-,·l menmn Style, 79  N\v· .  li . L .  
R EV .  900, 934-39 ( 1 984-85)  (describing bureaucracies as  rcl a ( Ional  commu n i t ies) . 
1 5S See I F. HAYEK,  supra note 1 46, at ! 3S! .  
I S�J See Horwi tz ,  Public/Pnva/e, supra n o te 1 2 1 ,  at 1 42 7 .  H orwitz sees i n terest-group 
p l u ra l i s m  as  a privniza t ion of public ma tters . 
1 t>O Viewed from a meta p o l i t ical  level ,  i n terest  group p l u ra l i s ts  argu i n g  that  manage­
ment  corporations are public i n s t i tu ti o n s  occupy substantial  common gro u n d  with  i n d i ­
v i d u a l i s t s  arguing that  t h e v  a r e  p r i v a t e  i ns t i tu t ions .  Both s i d e s  hold a su spicion of 
orga n i cist thinking-a p o i n t  of  v iew u n d e r  which the interests of  col lect ivi t ies ,  a h s o l u teh· 
conceived , mav be deemed paramoun t .  Romano,  supra note 1 1 0 .  at 935  (org<1nicist  
f,r . .  
1 989] THE "lvEXUS OF CONTRACTS "  CORPORA TION 443 
Corporate doctrine ins tantiates this complex real i ty .  Conces­
s ion theory, s trongly asserted , as a result  never achieved quiet en­
joyment as determinative doctrine. Instead, corporate doctrine 
recognized that autonomous individuals generate the determinative 
energies in business arrangements and reach for the s tate ' s  aid only 
to make their arrangements st ick . 1 6 1 Corporate doctrine ,  however, 
has never looked solely  to contract either to cons titute or to explain 
business organizations . Again practice constrains the theory; s tate 
involvement remain vis ible to a l l .  
Theoretical tugs of war across  the public-private dividing l ine 
have l imited value. At some point, pol i ti cal discuss ions based on 
characterizations of the corporation derived ex ante from economic 
or political theories retain only a tenuous bearing on the corpora­
tion as a practical legal inst i tut ion. Positive learning about corpora­
tions ceases and ins truction elucidates only the observers '  pol i ti cal 
values and aspirations . Corporate legal discussion should apply the­
ories of public and private gently, to highlight  matters of degree. 
The practical t ie can gain strength by ex post inspection of corporate 
doctrine for its ontological and pol i tical contents . 
2 .  Corporate Doctrine as Corporate Political Themy 
Corporate doctrine accommodates both individual and sover­
eign roles of firms with much less apparent s train than the theoreti­
cal discourse suggests . The coexis tence of public and private 
elements in the doctrine teaches a lesson about the poli tical values 
operating in corporate regulation. For example, the concession no­
tion survives in  corporate doctrine 1 G:2 even though i t  disappeared 
from theory .  Corporations s ti l l  are created only upon application to 
s tates .  This formal ism pers i s ts even though no one seriously ac­
cepts the notion that the s tate "breathes l i fe" into the corporation 
and even though corporate lawyers assume that corporations are re­
ifications s temming from the shared consciousness of individual s .  
No commentary of the new economic theory, however, chal­
lenges this last incident of concession theory in corporate doctrine.  
The commentators dismiss  corporate creation through s tate filing as 
t h i n k i n g  h a s  a uracted few adherents i n  American corpora t e  go\·ernancc l i tera tu re) . 
B o t h  sides s eek a p o l i t ics  s tr u c tured around respect  for the i n terests of s m a l l e r  socia l  
u n i t s-the i n teres t group i n  o n e  case,  a n d  t h e  i n d iv idual  in  t h e  o t her. Both s ides are 
n o n hierarch ical ly  d i sposed,  a lbei t  in  differ e n t  degrees .  See Frug,  supm n o t e  23,  a t  1 356-
59,  1 37 4 .  B o t h  s i des pursue a v is ion o f  freedom t h a t  counsels  res tra int  o f  t h e  po\\·er of 
bureaucracies .  
I r> I See generally Jacobson,  supm n o t e  1 1 7 .  
I t>:2 51'1' I H .  OLECK,  M o DERN Co RPO RATIO"i LAW 4 ,  2 1  ( 1 958)  ( example of pos t-war 
doctr inal  concep t i on s ) .  
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minis terial and de minimis . 1 G3 In the alternative,  they explain fi l ing 
and other mandatory provis ions of s tate corporation law as cost  s av­
ing ways of giving economic actors what they want . 1 G4 Such expla­
nations carry weight, of course ,  but they incompletely depict 
corporate doctrine 's  political operations .  
The shortcomings of cos t  reduction a s  an  explanation for s ta te 
creation of corporations become apparent upon comparing the dif­
ferent formalit ies attending the contractual creation of subs tantively 
s imilar business arrangements . Complex joint ventures and other 
organizations arise  without s tate fil ing as do large i s sues of  long 
term debt  securities . Debt securit ies are long-term corporate invest­
ment arrangements between management groups and outs iders . 
The same actors , when dealing in equity securit ies ,  avail themselves 
of the positive law terms which the new economic theoris ts charac­
terize as "off the rack" contract terms .  The debt s ecurit ies carry 
contractually-imposed governance s tructures dealing with the same 
subject matter as s tate corporate l aw. 1 65  But debt governance s truc­
tures emerge without ex ante s tate participation . 
An act of consent may be  implied to explain the s ta te ' s  absence 
from the creation of "off the rack" terms respecting debt securi­
ties-the parties have decided to keep the s tate out .  Their own s tan­
dardized contracts keep the cost of  bond contract terms down, so 
the s tate is  unnecessary. 1 GG It follows that if the parties keep govern­
ance costs down by writing their own debt contracts , corporate law 
should evolve similarly to treat the creation of relationships b etween 
equity holders and corporate entities . The technical changes are ac­
complished easily; upon this change in the law, any ski l led corporate 
law technician could devise a contractual governance system for a 
given corporation.  Investors would contract with managers or  con­
tract inter se  to form corporations under s tandard contracts contain­
mg prov1s1ons much l ike present s tate corporation laws ,  or 
I G3 See H essen, supra note 1 08 ,  at 1 3 36-38 .  
1 (i4 See, e.g. , Easterbrook & Fischel , l 'otzng, supra note 5 ,  at 4 0 1 (vot ing rules o f  state 
corporate law explained as means of  economizing on costs of contract ing) ; Easterbrook 
& Fischel ,  C01porate Control Transactions , supra note 5,  at  702 (s tate corporate law fiduciary· 
duties as cost-sa\· ing approximations o f  what the parties would bargai n  for themselves ) .  
1 (i5 Among other th ings ,  trust i ndentures have procedural provis ions governing 
security holder vot ing;  thev s ta te  groundrules for l i t igat ion by  secur i tyholders ; they es­
tabl ish secur i tyholder rights to inspect  books and records; they forbid managerial se lf­
deal ing; and they restrict management discret ion .  Ser generally A M E R I C A N  BAR F o u :>� DA­
TI O N ,  CORPO RATE DEBT FINANCING PROJ ECT, C O M M ENTARIES O N  MODEL D E B E!\TU R E  I N­
DENTL; R E  PROV I S I O N S  1 96 5 .  M O D E L  D E B ENTU RE I N D ENTU RE PROV I S I O N S  ALL R EG I STERED 
IssuEs, 1 967 A N D  C E RTA I N  N EGOTIABLE PROVI S I O N S  ( 1 9 7 1  ) ; .\ !ode! Snnplird lndrn ttm, 3 8  
Bus. LAw. 74 1 ( 1 98 3 ) .  
1 ( ) b  See Bratton,  The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds ,  1 984 vVIs .  L. R EY .  
667,  680-88 (discussing the cffi ci encv of the standard form bond contract ) . 
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s ignificantly, such different provisions as the actors deem appropri­
ate . Choice of law clauses would bring the benefits of the law and of 
decis ionmaking of sympathetic jurisdict ions . On this model ,  corpo­
rate contract formation works l ike other contract formation .  It re­
quires no ex ante obeiscence to some sovereign. Concession theory 
finally disappears from the law. 
Corporations as we know them could be created easi ly by con­
ventional contract .  If the corporation really " i s"  contract ,  as the 
new economic theory tells us, then the last  doctrinal ves tiges of s tate 
interference should have withered away by now, along with the su­
perannuated pol itical theories that prompted their invention in the 
first place. But the sovereign presence pers i s ts . Traces of conces­
sion theory survive in the mundane corporate formal i ties  mandated 
in law. Whether or not most parties want these formalit ies in most 
s i tuations , they remain as a practical matter, res trict ions on free­
dom of contract .  They foreclose organizational and governmental 
a lternatives ordinarily available to contracting part ies ,  and in a dy­
namic economic environment ordinarily chosen by them . 
This sovereign presence, mediated by corporate lawyers ,  l imits 
and condi tions the freedom of contract in corporate relationships . 
The contracting capacity of corporate actor suffers l i t t le impairment 
as a practical matter since they can comply wi th corporate formali­
ties at low cost and since corporate formalities rarely obs truct attain­
ment of s ignificant economic obj ectives . But the s tate clearly 
reserves the right to rewrite the ground rules and to constrain the 
freedom of corporate actors . H>7 Even as corporate law lets the par­
ticipants proceed ,  i t  in effect cautions them that they may act at wil l  
only if  on good behavior. 1 GH Corporate law facil itates and legiti­
mates private behavior, but with a reservoir of suspicion and a threat 
of constraint. 
One function of corporate law, then , i s  symbolic :  I t  reminds 
actors that corporate contracting rights have a lessor magnitude 
than the contracting rights attending most other business relation­
ships . This function explains and jus tifies corporate law's  survival as 
a posi tive law phenomenon in a world where other complex busi­
ness relationships proceed under the private, general law of 
contracts . 1 6�) 
H> 7  This appears to be the message of our  greatest  corporate law case ,  Dartmouth 
Col lege v .  Woodward , 1 7  U . S .  (4 Wheat . )  5 1 8  ( 1 8 1 9) .  l,· i th i ts  s imul taneous prov is ion 
for a co!1lractual corpora tion and the const i tut ional reservation of  sovereign right to 
change the terms governing the corporate comract .  
I ( )H  The enduring poss ib i l i tv o f  state d isso lut ion by  means of  a quo warranto proceed­
ing makes this  t hreat exp l i c i t .  See, e.g. ,  DEL. COJ:Jt.. ANN. t it .  8,  § 1 24(3)  ( 1 98 3 ) .  
I t>q Corporate law has more than one funct ion.  of  course.  I t  also influences the con­
tracting process by stat ing the terms that govern absent contrary agreement .  Since con-
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Even as  corporate law imposes a posi tive law framework, how­
ever, i t  tends to leave corporate actors se lf-regulated . Corp orate 
law decisionmakers accept the doctrine ' s  mixed basis and hesitate to 
question the balance i t  s trikes between individual , contractual in i tia­
tive , and positive law res train t .  Indeed, the theory of the firm rarely 
influences corporate law decisionmaking, even though such deci­
s ionmaking routinely formulates corporate law in terms of bo th cor­
porate entities and separate relationships ,  and in terms of both 
"public" corporations and "private" contract rights . Conveniently,  
the mixed doctrine provides ad hoc theoretical justificat ion for a 
range of dispositions ,  from sovereign intervention to individual  se lf­
responsibil i ty .  The doctrinal d iscourse focuses on practical ques­
t ions and answers , considered s i tuationally .  The sudden as sertion 
of an absolute proposit ion that the corporation i s  contract wil l  not  
d is turb this pattern, even though i t  may influence the balance s truck 
in particular s i tuations .  
IV 
THE NExus OF CoNTRACTS , CoNTRACT THEORY AND THE 
CoRPORATE FrRM 
Lawyers and economists employ different ,  although related,  no­
tions of contract .  The lawyer understands contract as a b us iness  or 
commercial exchang·e: Class ical contract doctrine and the lawyer ' s  
mental images of the  documentation of particular transactions  cir­
cumscribe this conception .  The economist  thinks more broadly in 
terms of voluntary exchanges and other relations among free 
agent s .  For the economist ,  any particular transaction will b e  a theo­
retical construct ,  devised outside his tory through the manipulat ion 
of hypothetical economic actors . 
Legal scholars draw on both conceptions of contract and on 
others besides . They associate wi th the  concept of  contract a range 
of  different assertions , both pos itive and normative, from theory 
and from practice, and perhaps varying the contents of  the asser­
t ions in differen t contexts . Through Macnei l ' s  capacious relational 
theory academic contract now extends from the narrow confines of 
classical contract doctrine to accommodate virtually  all relat ionships 
among the actors in a modern , heavily bureaucratized , and exhaus­
tively governed society . 1 7 0 
This multipl ic i ty of con tract concepts has made difficult  the re­
ception of the nexus of contracts corporation into legal theory .  
t rary agreement i s  reached only a t  addit ional cost ,  t h e  l a w  inevitably bears on t h e  
cont ract terms.  
1 70 ScP I .  MACNEIL,  sujJia note 87;  f\lacnei i ,  supra note 89; f\lacnei l ,  supra note I 5 7 ;  
Macnei l . Re/atio11al Con!mr/: J!'hal  l l 'e D o  a n d  D o  .\.of Know,  l 985  WIS .  I . .  REv. 4 8 3 .  
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When the new economic theory firs t appeared, most  corporate legal 
academics shared the legal practit ioner's unders tanding of contract .  
Corporate scholarship drew doctrinal dis t inctions between corpo­
rate and contract law, 1 7 1 displaying l i t t le consciousness of the fun­
damental p lace contract , more broadly conceived, always held in 
corporate legal theory . The nexus of contracts assertion introduced 
a different, very particular concept of contract .  Prior corporate 
l i terature offered no basis  for informed and critical evaluation of 
this unfamil iar economic concept of contract. Yet  no commentary 
identifying this concept 's  distinguishing characterist ics accompanied 
its  introduction. Interdiscipl inary exercises ,  mismanaged in this 
way, carry a danger of communicative fai lure and, worse ,  an oppor­
tuni ty for s trategic obfuscation of  meaning. Not surpri s ingly ,  confu­
sion resulted. 
The nexus of contracts assertion entered popular corporate law 
discourse with a somewhat mystifying aspect .  It made sense .  I ts un­
spoken individualist underpinnings resonated and its advocates em­
ployed analytical tools of an undoubtedly contractual character. But 
their analyses , while called "con tractual , "  did not resemble corpo­
rate law applications of the principles of the lates t contracts Restate­
ment. 1 7'2 Sometimes , these applications of "contract" to corporate 
law questions brought results flowing from neither prevail ing cor­
porate doctrine nor prevail ing contract doctrine .  1 7 :1 
Evaluating the new economic theory as a corporate law tool re­
quires an init ial unders tanding of the meaning of the " cont ract" in 
the "nexus of contracts . "  This part of this article seeks to provide 
the necessary explication .  I ts firs t subpart sets out the range of ap­
proaches to contract that appear in contemporary legal theory. I t  
identifies the elements that dis tinguish these theories-the s tress of  
I 7 1 51'1' B ra t t o n .  sujJm note 1 66 ,  a t  7 30 - 3 5  ( b l a c k  l e t ter law d i s t i n gu i s h i n g  corporate 
du t ies from contract dut ies ) ;  !vi . EISENBERC.  sujna n o t e  82. a t  9- 1 0 ; I F.  O ' N L\ L  & R. 
THOMPSON, O'NEAL's C LOSE C O R POR.·\TIONS § 5.05 ( 1 987 )  (con tra s t i ng· c o rp o rate law 
model with close corpora t i o n  arrangements  based on bargai n s  a m o n g  t h e  p a rt i es) . 
1 7 '2  R ESTATEM ENT (SECOND) oF Co NT ftc\CTs ( 1 98 1  ) .  
Recent work begins to clear u p  t h i s  confu s ion b v  s e l cc t iYeh· draw i n g  o n  contract  
doctr ine i nstead o f  economic t heorY in e laborat ing con tractual  m o d i f1 c a t i o n s  o f  corpo­
rate law. Coffee o ffers a " ' web of cont ract s "  coun ter.  i n s p i red bY t h e  neoclass ica l  con­
t ract doctrine o f  Corbin a n d  t h e  Res t a t em e n t  ( S econd ) .  St'f Coffee, sujJm n o t e  G .  at 924 -
2 5 ;  Coffee,  Thr [ 'ncerlmn Case for Takt•m ·n H.ejom1 . 1n Es.lf/Y on Storkho!dns. Siakeho!dt'l:( and 
Bus!- ( jJs , 1 98 8  Wis .  L .  REv. -l 3 S :  .\PI' gr·npm//y i\ l a s t c n .  supm note 9-l . 
1 7 � Easterbrook and Fischel s u gges t .  lo r exam p l e .  a rule  of manageria l  p a s s i v i t v  i n  
the face of a take-over b id .  Easterbrook & Fisch e l .  T h e  F'tojJn Rolr of a Trn;!!,PI \ .\ fr111agnnenl 
in Rl'sf.'onding In a Tendn Oj/er .  9-1 1-hR\ . L. R n . I I () l .  1 1 7-l -82 ( 1 98 1  ) : St'C al'o S c o t t .  sujmt 
note S .  a t  93 0<1 7  ( s u gges t ing a b o l i t i o n  o [  t h e  corporate law d u t \  o f  care on t h e  ground 
that  market  m o n i t o r i n g  mechan i s m s  are a d eq u a t e ) :  \\' o l fso n .  sujJ !o  n o t e  :\ a t  975-78 ,  
D 8 0 - 8 2  ( s u gges t i n g  fl d u c i a n· scru u m  o f  managL·mcnt sa lar ies  and t h e  corporate oppor­
t u n i t v  doctr ine are unneccssarv ) .  
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discrete and relational contracts , the s tress of different individual 
and community values ,  and the use of differently conceived con­
tracting actors . I t  draws on these elements of contract theory to de­
scribe the corporation and corporate doctrine .  I t  presents the 
corporation as a complex contract, s imultaneously containing dis­
crete and relational elements ,  and presents corporate doctrine as a 
mediating device that permits the legal  treatment of corporate s i tua­
t ions to vary according to varying contract particulars . 
The succeeding subparts examine the concepts of  power and 
consent operative in  the nexus of contracts concept .  This discus­
s ion asserts that the new theory ' s  primary contribut ion is  the inter­
pretation of corporate relat ionships in terms of voluntary 
participation. It contras ts the different assumptions underlying the 
h ierarchical , managerial is t  p icture and it concludes that ,  while the 
new theory i solates consensual and transactional elements in  corpo­
rate relations ,  and while the managerial is t  p icture unduly minimizes 
these elements , the new theory ultimately asks far too much of the 
concept of consent .  In reaching this  conclus ion,  the discuss ion i so­
lates  the narrow base of l iberal and uti l i tarian values that  inform the 
new economic theory and draws on twentieth century contract the­
ory for its critique of consent as a basis for j us tifying enforcement of  
contracts .  
A .  Theories of Contract-Discrete and Relational 
l .  The Individual versus the Contract 
Theories of contract embody concepts of human relations . In  
part ,  these concepts are the pos it ive results of  observation of the 
behavior patterns of real world contracting actors . But the concepts 
also contain values .  Sometimes the values originate w i th real world 
contracting actors , sometimes they originate wi th the theori s t ,  and 
sometimes they originate with some wider community.  When they 
originate with the theori s t  or the community, the values will l ikely 
manifest themselves as norms .  
Different theories of  contract incorporate different vis ions of  
the  contracting actor. Where the theory cas ts neoclass ica l  rational 
economic actors in al l  the roles ,  the resulting contracts will be "di s ­
crete" 1 7-+ or "purposive . "  1 7 '> These ideal contracts resemble the ab­
s tract market transactions of the real world .  They are complete,  
concrete, and delimi ted and they "presentiate" 1 7 ti and quantify al l  
1 74 l .  MACNE I L ,  SlljJra n o t e  8 7 ,  a t  J 0- 1 1 .  
1 7 "> M .  'W E B E R .  EcoNOi\.!Y AND Soci ETY (}68-8 1 (G .  Roth & C. \'\' i t t l ich e el s .  1 968 ) ;  sre 
A .  KRONM.-\.N ,  i\lAX WEBER 1 0 1  ( 1 98 3 ) .  
1 7 ti I .  M.\C N E ! L ,  sujJra n o t e  8 7 ,  a t  59-60 . 
I 
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foreseeable  matters respecting the relationship.  The actors separate 
their identit ies from the contract .  Since the actors enter completely 
planned relationships ,  they in theory bind themselves to the con­
tract and restrict their future choices without impairing their free­
dom as individuals . 1 7 7  Legal scholarship that draws on the 
neoclass ical microeconomic model applies the discrete mode to 
business relationships .  Class ical contract doctrine tends to do so as 
wel l .  
Other theories of contract enviSion differently const ituted ac­
tors with cognitive and analytical fai l ings . These actors sometimes 
fai l  to presentiate and quantify entire relationships ,  particularly 
when relationships endure for long periods of time and depend on 
contingent events . The theories draw on a wide range of values to 
formulate principles that explain,  facil itate, and jus ti fy the survival 
of these relationships in the face of these difficult ie s .  The actors ' 
initial acts of  consent provide a s tarting point, but t ime and events 
sometimes distance the participants from their init ial consents . As 
the scope and effective range of the actors ' in itial consent narrows 
with respect to the developing and changing relationship , o ther val­
ues must provide sustenance .  The relationship continues on a foun­
dation of reciprocal exchange, but the actors feel bound less by their 
pas t actions than by their present s tate of mutual dependency . Such 
mutually dependent actors look to values of relational preservation,  
sol idari ty, and flexibi l i ty to integrate themselves and their individual 
interes ts with the terms of the ongoing relationship . 
Recognizing these relational elements in contracts raises a 
political question whether the relationship,  and values internal to i t ,  
may be  privileged over the independence of the individual partici­
pants . Assuming individuali s t  values of any intensity, sovereign in­
tervention on behalf of the relationship poses dangers . The 
l i terature contains various responses to the problem. Some theories 
s train to leave the individual dominant and fully respected and, at 
the same time, recognize both relational contingency and sovereign 
in tervention . They usually interpret creatively the individual ' s  act of 
consent . as the means to this end.  The consenting individual in  
some measure creates and in some measure controls ; thereby he 
bears responsibil i ty for the later dominant relationship . 1 7H The in­
s titutional variant of the new economic theory represents one ver-
I 77 This descrip t ion encaps u lates !\lacnc i l ' s  d i scuss ions .  SPP id. a t  59-64 ; l'vlacnei l .  
suprn note 8 9 ,  at  3 60-6 1 .  
1 7 H Professor Charles Fried in terprets the pron1isc expansi\·ely .  -rhe pron1ise in­
l okes a com·ention giving another moral ground on 11 h ich to expect performance. Thus 
the relat ionship is  based on tru s t .  v\'hen the p:• n ies '  explicit arrangements fai l  lO pro­
l'ide de termining rules for the rela t ionship ,  judges in tervene to pro tect  the part ies '  trus t­
ing expecta t ions .  Since the contract ing actors seck fairness and consent to  a fai r  regime, 
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s ion of this  approach . 1 79 
Under other theories ,  the relationship may dominate the indi­
vidual and ex ante individual consent need not be  drawn on for legit i ­
mation . These "communitarian" theories recognize  independent 
value in symbiotic relationships between individuals and between 
groups and individuals . 1 80 Most  of these theorists refrain from em­
bodying these values in norms manifested in pos it ive l aw . 1 8 1 While 
not  individualis t s ,  they share the American aversion to the con-. 
s traints on freedom imposed within the modern bureaucratic s tate .  
2 .  Contract Themy and the Corporate Firm 
The corporate firm rai ses the same theoretical choices between 
the individual and the relationship that other contracts raise­
choices between discrete and relational conceptions and b etween in­
d ividual and community values . Corporate doctrine ,  in  effect ,  takes 
posit ions on these choices .  It suggests the possibi l i ty that individual 
interests may be legi timately subordinated to those of a larger firm 
community and i t  imposes this treatment as a matter of posit ive law. 
Despite this recognition of rela tional bonds , however, corporate 
doctrine does not privilege the group over the individual unequivo­
cally .  The corporate community is voluntary , and its common goals 
tend to play l imi ted roles in  the lives of i ts  members . The same 
individual ist  values supporting the discrete vision of contract inevi­
tably influence corporate relationships ,  creating tension between 
these values and uti l itarian goals of  the group and related group 
values . Corporate doctrine eases this tens ion .  I t  mediates disputes 
between the interes ts of  corporate participants and those of the 
group.  I t  draws both on values of discrete contract and on rela­
t ional values of mutual support .  It affords a bas is  on which group 
interests may dominate individual interests legitimately on a fact 
specific bas i s .  The legal model of the di screte contract influences 
corporate doctrine but does not dominate i t .  
Relational contract theory explains the subordinated posi tion 
l a t e r  sovereign i n terv e n t i o n  a n d  d i re c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  v i o l a t e  t h e i r  i n d iv i du a l  a u t o n o m y .  
See C .  F R I E D ,  CoNTRACT AS PROM ! S E  1 4 - 1 7 , 8 3  ( 1 98 3 ) .  
I 7\J Sa .1 upm text accompa n y i n g  n o t e s  59-86 . 
I HO See I .  l'vl.:..c N E I L ,  supra n o t e  87: Feinman, Cn/ica l  :!pproarhes to Contract Law, 30 
UCLA L REv.  8 '29 ( 1 98 :1 ) ;  Kenned1 , f)/.,tnbul i i'f anrl Pa/ema!isl .\ lotn,es in Contmcl and Tort 
Law. with SjJma! Hifnrnce /o Compulsory Tnms and [ 'nequnl Br ngaining Pml'er, 4 1  M o .  L R E v .  
563 ( 1 982) [ hereinafter K e n n e d v .  Patnnnlwn J :  K e n n e d v ,  Form and Substance 1 11 Pnva/e Law 
.-ldj udimtlon ,  89 H,\RI-_ L REv. 1 685 ( 1 976) .  
I H 1 :'vlacnei l  accomp l i s h e s  t h i s  by l i m i t i n g  h i s  p o s i t i ,·e theori z i n g  t o  values w h i l e  s i -
mul taneous l v  trea t i n g  t h e  sovereign 11 i t h  cri t i c a l  scru t i m . Cri t i ca l  l egal  s t udies  a d h er­
e n t s  d ra1,· on the u to p i a n  t ra d i t i o n  o f  the Frankfu r t  School i n s t ea d .  
A t  least  o n e  t h e o r i s t  looks t o  s o n:rci gn i mpos i t i on of comm u n i ta r i a n  v a l u e s .  Si'P 
U n ger.  The C:ril iml Legal Studlrs .\fol 'f'lllfl l l ,  96 H .\RV.  L REv.  56 1 ( 1 98 3 ) .  
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of discrete contract in corporate legal doctrine .  The discrete con­
tract ,  with its expectations of individual advantage s ecured by the 
threat of s tate enforcement, fai l s  to provide a sufficiently durable 
foundation for cooperative action.  Planning depends on mutual 
trust ,  and the law facil i tates mutual trust  through s tate created obl i ­
gations . 1 82 In  the corporate l aw context, the fiduciary conception 
usually plays this role. 
The new economic theory proposes that we reconceive the firm 
on a less relational basis than that previously establ i shed and mani­
fes ted in corporate doctrine .  The neoclass ical variant  proposes the 
more substantial departure. As  we have seen , i ts  nexus of contracts 
consists of  discrete contracts among rational economic actors , and 
the firm springs up as a spontaneous productive order. This con­
ception unequivocally favors individual values .  Communitarian 
norms disappear s ince they serve neither as ins truments for produc­
tivi ty nor as appropriate ethical responses in the market-like world 
envisioned . 
The inst i tutional variant ofFers a vis ion of the firm more closely 
rela ted to tradi tional corporate doctrine .  When confronted with the 
problem of jus tifying a complex relationship, however, the institu­
tionalists make the common move among individual ist  theories of 
contract . They establ i sh individual dominance by elaborating a 
s tructure of consensual participation . 
Both variants conflict with the more relational assumptions con­
ventionally held by corporate lawyers . The following discuss ion ad­
dresses these conflicts . I t  first contras ts the concepts of power 
operative in the new theory with those operative in  corporate doc­
trine .  I t  then considers concepts of consent. 
B. Power 
1 .  The l\lfanageriahst Hierarchy 
The managerial ist  approach views the firm as hierarchical-a 
s tructure of power relationships 1 wl whose purpose i s  to organize 
productive behavior. 1 tH The power is  exercised unilaterally .  That 
i s ,  the superior in the hierarchy has the authori ty to direct the 
subordinate's actions or otherwise subject the subordinate to partic­
ular effects without the subordinate's consent . 1 Hf> 
1 H2 Gordon,  .\lnrau ley, .\ lameil, and the Dtsco< 'fl)' of So/!(/ariiY and Powl:'r 1 11 Con trnrl Law ,  
1 985  W i s .  L.  REv .  565 ,  569-70 (descri b i n g  i\ l ac a u l ev a n d  i\lacnei l ' s  r e l a t i o nal/discrete 
contract  d is t i nc t i o n  i n  t h e  corpora t e  s e t t i ng) . 
I H: �  C .  LINDBLO M ,  POLITICS . \!':D i'VL\RKETS 2 1  ( 1 977 ) . 
1 H-1 i\·!anv of course, recogmzc subsidiary purposes,  among them the maximizat ion o f  
n:t u rns to t h e  s to c k h o l ders ;md t h e  enrichmt: n t  a n d  emp owermen t o f  t h e  man agers. 
I H !> M a c n e i l ,  supra note I I , at 1 049 .  
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Power relations based on discrete contracts and other market­
based relationships have a very different s tructure. In the unrelated , 
atomis tic s ituations of the market, economic actors also seek to or­
ganize productive behavior. But actors in the market only have the 
power to abstain from conferring benefits on one another. By ef­
fecting exchanges , they forego continued exercise  of �his power.  In  
o ther words ,  ins tead of creating unilaterally held powers , discrete 
contracts vitiate unilaterally held powers through consent .  1 86 
The firm, viewed as an hierarchical s tructure of unila teral power 
relationships ,  s tands apart from the market as an entity. The firm 
experiences market forces because i t  buys or hires inputs on the 
market and sel ls i ts output on the market .  But internal ly ,  the firm 
resembles a l i t t le government . 1 87 This conception pervades modern 
legal and economic commentary on the firm appearing in works of 
those wi th widely divergent poli tical dispositions . 1 88 Even Hayek , 
who advances the spontaneous order as a pol itical and social ideal , 
p laces the modern corporation in the different category of organiza­
tions whose governing principles do not mix freely with those of 
markets . l s<J 
Carried over to the scrutiny of management corporations ,  these 
assumptions about firm organization raise  the basic manageriali s t  
point :  Corporate organization generates power and management i s  
s trategically s i tuated to possess  this power. Many dispute the pro­
priety of this corporate power as wielded by management .  On one 
side s tands familiar anti-managerial discourse ,  with its special em­
phasis on management's pmver to effect results external to the cor­
poration . 1 'l0 This discourse fits into broader cnoques of 
bureaucratic organizations ,  both corporate and governmental ,  and 
of the power they wield . 1 �1 1 At the other end of the range s tand ob-
1 81> !d. a t  I 036,  I 050. 
1 8 7 C .  L I N D B L O M ,  supra n o t e  ] 1):) ,  a t  36-38 .  
1 8 8  Co111pore 1d. a t  a t  2 1 -22 ,  33-38 ,  45-4 7 ,  <ulth 0 .  vVtLLJ..'I.MSON,  supra n o t e  30 .  a t  25-26 
( b o t h  describe and d i s t i nguish m a rk e t -based a n d  h i e ra r c h i c a l  organiza t i o n s  fro m q u i t e  
d i ffer e n t  p o l i t i c a l  p o i n t s  o f  view) . See I .  !\ L\c N E I L ,  s upra n o t e  87 ,  a t  7-8 ( d es c r i b i n g  b u ­
reaucr a t i c  eco n o m i c  orga n i z a t i o n s  a n d  s h o w i n g  t h e i r  exercise o f  u n i l a t e ra l  power) ; !v!ac­
n e i l ,  supra note ! 57 ,  a t  906 ( indiv iduals  a n d  orga n iz a t io n s  are u l t i ma tc l v  separate:  
i n ternal boundaries separate t h e  goa l s  o f  orga n i za t i o n s  from t h e  goals  o f  i n d i vi d u a l  
p a r t i c i p a n ts ) .  
l 8'l See 1 F .  HAYEK,  sujJm n o t e  ! 46 .  a t  47-5 1 :  3 F .  f-LwEK.  supm n o t e  1 0 L  a t  80-88 . 
Accord i n g  to Havek,  organ i z a t i o n s  arc c o n s t i t i l l l ted o f  ruks and c o m m a n d s .  The rules 
come fro m  the designing mind o f  the organ izer a n d  set  fo rt h orga n i z a t i o n a l  s tructures .  
They make i t  p o s s i b l e  to make usc o f  kno1dcdgc 1vh i c h  n o  one i n d i v i d u a l  p o s s e s s es as a 
w h o l e .  C o m mands prevai l  over r u l e s .  
H a Y e k ' s  spon taneous o rders e x i s t  s u bject  t o  c o n Y c n t i o n a l  r u l e s  \\· i t h o u t  t h e  neces­
s i ty  o f  commands.  1 F. H .\ YEK,  supm note 1 -H), a t  4 7-5 1 .  
l ' lO See gentm//y s ltjHo notes 1 2 7-37  and a c c o m p a n Y i n g  text .  
l ' l l  Ser i\ ! a c n e i l ,  sujHo n o t e  1 57 ;  Fr ug,  1 11jJm n o t e  23 .  
· i  
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servers like Hayek. H e  recognizes that organizational s tructures 
produce dangerous powers but  finds corporations to be benign or­
ganizations as a practical matter and remains unconcerned with 
their internal and external activities . 1 92 
Somewhere in the middle s tands the moderate anti-managerial­
ism of many post-war corporate legal academics . Berle elaborated 
the conventional wisdom in the mid- 1 950s . Management wields 
power in several arenas : I t  directs the activities of subordinates ; i t  
determines the existence and course of corporate business opera­
t ions;  it determines the markets the corporation supplies ;  it initiates 
technical developments ;  i t  directs the direction and extent of capi tal 
expansion; and, within l imits , it participates in the formulation of 
public opinion . 1 93 Berle argued that market forces and publ ic opin­
ion in a democratic s tate substantially constrain this power. Under 
this widely-held view, corporate law directed its policy-making ener­
gies to creating moderately intensified fiduciary principles and mar­
ket disclosure regulations . I 9-t 
Two new forces , one theoretical and the other practical , dis turb 
this Berlian picture of corporate power relationship s .  The theoreti­
cal challenge comes from the new economic theory . The practical 
challenge comes from the disruptive effects of the market for corpo­
rate control . The following discussion considers only the former. 1 �1" 
2 .  The Voluntm} Corporation of the New Economic Themy 
Consider again the unilateral power relationship that makes an 
organization hierarchical : A superior tells a subordinate what to do .  
To the extent that subordinate obeys involuntari ly ,  the relationship 
impairs his freedom and the superior coerces . Anti-managerial de­
scriptions of the corporation implicitly or explicitly assert that those 
empowered in the hierarchy coerce others . The new economic the­
oris ts differ by emphasizing the voluntary nature of corporate 
participation .  
This i s  a crucial move: Once corporate relationships are con­
ceived as ful ly  voluntary, a different picture of the corporate hierar­
chy emerges . Hierarchical power impairs no freedom, even though 
the superior tells the subordinate what to do .  As consent becomes 
I � J :! Havek w o u l d  res train monopolies .  O t!H.T11· ise c orpora te power does not  worrv 
h i m .  Organizat ions ,  he SJ\ S ,  w ie ld  l i t t l e  po 11-cr 0\ er " t h o s e  11•ho j o i n  to  fur t h e r  t h ei r  mm 
benefi t . "  3 F .  H.-\Y E K .  sujmt n o t e  I 0 I ,  a t  S0-89. 
I ' l :1 See .·\. . B E R L E ,  .wpm note 2 0 ,  at :) 2 - 3 -l .  
I �H The m o s t  recent ,  thorough-going rest< l tcmcnt o f  th is  , · ic11· comes from outs ide 
of t h e  legal  �tcaden1 1 . Sci' E .  H r: R M.-\ N ,  C o R POR.-\TE C o N T R O L ,  Co RPOR.-\TE PowER ( 1 98 1 ) . 
For a condensat ion .  see Herman,  Th,, f.tll/1/5 of thl' . \lark!'! as a Disciplinr in C:o1pomte Cm'l'nt ­
ana,  9 DEL. J. C o R P .  L 5 3 0 ,  5 3 3 - 3-l ( 1 98-l ) .  
l ' l5 For considera t i o n  o f  the la t ter  see B ra t t o n ,  .wpm n o t e  :3 , a t  ! 5 1  7 - 2 6 .  
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the relationship ' s  core, the model of discrete contract looks more 
and more appropriate. Fully voluntary participation negates the 
exis tence of the superior ' s  unilateral power and ,  in turn , allows re­
construction of a classic arm' s  length exchange, but in an apparently 
hierarchical context. 
The seminal articles in the new theoretical canon made this 
move to voluntariness .  The subsequent l i terature adds l i tt le  to this 
basic theoretical paradigm , even as i t  applies the paradigm more 
elaborately .  Coase 1 96 first looked inside the firm and asked why the 
owner of an input would sacrifice his property rights in i t  to be  told 
what to do by  the owner of firm .  He answers, of course ,  that the 
owner of the input gets value by  reducing transact ion costs . 
Although they could eliminate the firm and could price and s el l  al l  
the factors of production separately, information costs would make 
the determination of price too expensive. But Coase pos i ted more 
than an explanation of the firm's  exis tence in terms of  transaction 
cost  reduction.  He simultaneously introduced a transactional con­
ception of participation in the firm in which the surrendering input 
holder s trikes a deal . Hierarchical power springs from and coexists 
with the participant 's  choice . 
Alchian and Demsetz , the firs t to advance the neoclass ical vari­
ant ,  succeeded to these points . 1 'l 7  They cons tructed a firm not  only 
transactional , but consisting of discrete contracts .  The firm, they 
asserted, lacks power to sett le issues by fiat or by disciplinary action 
that i s  superior to that of a conventional market .  As they purged 
conventionally conceived power relationships from the firm, they 
also pushed out the conventional morality that res trains the power­
ful .  Corporate actors , they said,  should res trict their conduct to­
ward o thers to what it  would be if they ful ly  bore the ful l  costs of 
that conduct . 1 'lH One might  read this and similarly spirited rheto­
ric, 1 D'l to assert the nonexistence of the corporate hierarchy .  Hap­
pily ,  Alchian and Demsetz did not deny theoretical exis tence to this 
most familiar real world phenomenon. �wo Their "joint team produc-
I 9G Coasc, supm note 39,  at 390-9 1 .  
I t  is general lv accepted that people create firm h ierarchies and subjec t  themselves to 
the ir  governance i n  order to create  ,,·c. d th .  Disputes ar ise as to the part icu lar  wea l th­
creat ing effect possessed bv  firm organizat ion . Coasc"s emphas i s  on transact ion costs i s  
one of a number of sugges t ions .  The division of labor, the coordinat ion of  product ion ,  
and the al locat ion of investmenl risk a l l a l so h;.J\T been suggested . Srr Cheung . . wpm 
no te 35 ,  at 3 -5 .  
I ! l 7  See Alch ian  & Demsetz, supm note  �9 .  at  7 7 7 ,  794 . 
I !lH fd at 79 1 .  
I ' l ! l  Sre supm notes 95-97 and accomp;uwing tex t .  
:!00 Indeed, i t  is l ikelv that a cornplet ch· unh ierarchical  f irm ,,·ould fai l  to hold to­
gether. Macnei l  notes that discre teness and presen t ia t ion cannot be made absolute i n  
relat ional s i tuat ions . They can pre\ ai l  o n l v  s o  l o n g  a s  thev avoid c<in fl i c t  w i t h  o ther 
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t ion" model of the firm centers on a combined owner and residual 
claimant which looks l ike an enti ty and possesses numerous powers . 
Among other things ,  i t  observes the input behavior of  team mem­
bers , determines the terms of firm participation contracts ,  and ter­
minates firm membership .  20 1 "Hierarchical" seems a fair 
description of this organizational s tructure . 
Sympathetically read ,  then, Alchian and Demsetz 's  work posits 
that the hierarchical s tructures necessary in complex production 
processes do not constrain their participants . The firm lacks supe­
rior directive power because a participating rational economic actor 
who disl ikes the terms  of the deal offered can walk away and find an 
arrangement that better suits him. The hierarchical s tructure exis ts ,  
but  on a foundation of perfect consent of participants without 
human weaknesses . 
All exercises in the new economic theory after Coase and Al­
chian and Demsetz assume voluntary participation in the firm. The 
subsequent models develop an inverted conception of some of the 
hierarchical relations described in the manageriali s t  p ictures of the 
firm .  Within the new economic theory, inves tors in the firm delegate 
decisional authori ty to firm managers . 202 The managers ,  accord­
ingly, lose their s tatus as hierarchical superiors ; in the switch , they 
become the "agents" of the participants . For example Fama and 
Jensen ' s  reconstruction of the relationships between directors, of­
ficers and s tockholders refrains from employing the image of hierar­
chy in characterizing corporate organization .20:" It conceives of the 
organization in power-neutral terms ,  as a "decision proces s . "  The 
s tockholders , or residual claimants ,  delegate decisional authority. 
Transactional efficiency dictates that decis ion-making  be  split into 
two functions , decision "control" and decision "management ."  In­
terestingly  the officers do not possess decision contro l ,  as the mana­
gerial picture would suggest .  Rather, Fama and Jensen echo the 
doctrinal model of corpora te organization and place decision con­
trol in the board of directors , which ratifies and monitors the man­
agers . The subordinated managers do not control ;  they "manage" 
by initiating and implementing decis ions .  This s tructure has , of 
course,  evolved as means toward cost reduction . 
The two variants of the new economic theory share Fama and 
Jensen ' s  notions that the firm hierarchy arises from delegations of 
rela t ional values. In  case of  conH ic t ,  e i ther the other values prevai l  or the rei<J t ionship 
fal l s  <�part .  I .  M.K N E I L, supm note 87 ,  J t  8G.  
20 I Alchian & Demsetz ,  supm note 29,  at 783-85 .  
202 See, e.g. , Eas terbrook & Fischel ,  Co1pomt, Control Transactions, sup ra note 5 ,  at 700;  
Romano,  supra note 1 1 0,  a t  929.  
�w:1 See Fama & Jensen, supra note 1 0 . at  302 -03 , 307-08,  3 1 0- 1 1 ,  3 1 4 .  
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power by firm participants and that the delegations occur as means 
to the end of cost reduction . Both also recognize that the delega­
tions themselves produce their own costs-agency cos ts . From 
here, their differing operative conceptions of the economic actor 
cause the neoclassical and inst itutional variants to d iverge . The 
fully rational actor tends to accomplish the delegation and the re­
duction of attendant agency costs by entering into d i screte con­
tracts . The bounded rationality and opportunis tic tendencies of the · 
inst i tutionali s t s '  actors , in  contrast ,  lead to contract fai lures in  the 
delegation process .  A more relational inquiry into the contract of 
delegation results ,  but it remains s trictly contained by the assump­
tion of voluntary cost reduction . �04 
Professor Anthony Kronman uses cost  effective delegation to 
explain virtually every value that d is tinguishes relational  contracts 
from discrete contracts . �05 His explanatory concept is " union , "  a 
device employed by contracting parties to reduce the r isks of non­
s imul taneous exchange. The concept of union encompasses al l  ar­
rangements reducing divergences of interes t by promoting the spiri t  
o f  identity o r  comradery . Thus,  union would seem t o  explain nearly 
all community values .  The explanation implies that these values do 
not exist simply because people pursue common not ions of the 
good.  Union is  a "s trategy" that works by eliminating the separate­
ness that makes opposit ion of interes ts poss ible ,  and thus reduces 
costs . 
3 .  Comments 
The new economic theory makes a contribution wi th these re­
constructions of the elements of long-term contractual relation­
ships .  It shows the elements of exchange in relat ions previously 
viewed as entirely hierarchical . But i t  has a concomitant weakness .  
The new economic theoris ts  overs tate their insight by relentlessly 
modell ing the relationships in terms of exchange and delegation 
only. The neoclassicists achieve this one-sided picture by reshaping 
the real world to fit  the paradigm. The inst i tutionali s t s '  concept of 
" union" reshapes the paradigm of the contract to encompass more 
of the real world .  
Both exercises are too reductive .  Complex corporate organiza­
tions involve both a consensual element and the cons traints of the 
superior's exercise of authori ty . Looking only at consent in charac­
terizing the relationship unduly restricts our view, caus ing us to lose 
:! O -+  Recen t l v ,  t h e  leading i n s t i t u t i o n :.d i s t  s u ggested t h a t  n e1v eco n o m i c  t h eorists  
s tu d y  h i e rarch y, rem edying previ o u s  neglect .  See W i l l ia m s o n ,  supra note 1 4 .  at  8 7- 8 8 .  
�0 5 Kronman,  :,upra n o t e  1 1 2 ,  a t  20-25 .  
I 
j 
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touch with the  participants ' perceptions . Neither the  subordinate 
employee who sees himself fol lowing directions ,  nor the investor 
who suffers from a manager' s  questionable application of contrib­
uted capital attributes the s i tuation to a choice made from an in­
dependent pos i tion . Ins tead , both perceive a posi tion of regrettable 
dependence s temming from the received s tructure of the relation­
ship . Examining the relationship restricted to a notion of a s ingle 
deep level of  consent ignores whole dimensions of practical real­
i ty-economic, psychological and social . 20G Furthermore, attribut­
ing a participant 's perceptions of dependency and powerlessness to 
false consciousness and weakness accords the participant less than 
ful l  respect .  
C .  Consent 
The nexus of contracts concept p laces the corporation on a 
foundation of contractual consent .  Models pursuant to i t  conjoin 
ini tial consent to contract with corporate governance s tructures .  
The "delegation" of power in management corporations and the 
"consent ' ' to contract describe different aspects and different conse­
quences of the same act of participating in the new economic firm . 
Thus united ,  the concepts do not permit  easy and complete separa­
t ion, and the new economic cons truct deploys them jo intly .  With­
out consent ,  the actor could not plausibly delegate power to other 
corporate participants ; i f  the ongoing exercise of authority by those 
empowered in the firm stems from delegation, then the subordi­
nates ' consent is  implic i t .  
l .  Consent, Liberalism and UtiLitananism 
Whether denominated "consent" or "delegation ,"  these ac­
tions perform the same function as the "manifestation of assent" 
under class ical contract law. Consent binds the actor to the ar­
rangement and makes enforcement by the sovereign consonant with 
human freedom. 207 This approach manifests a l iberal vision in 
20<; The d iscussion in the text  dra1�·s on l\!acnci l ' s  cri t ic ism of Alchian and Demsetz .  
SPP Macne i l ,  supm note l l , a t  1 053 n .92 .  CJ M .  DAN-COHEN ,  supra note 2,  a t  34-35 (dis­
cuss ing the behanor patterns of incl i \· idua ls  who at tach themselves to  organiza t ions) . 
2 0 7  The new theorv's consent appl ies more read i ly  to a pure economic context than 
to a corporate law contex t .  Economic methodologv permi ts  hvpothet ical actors to con­
tract against blank s lates .  Wi th in  a model , a s ingle act of assent mav bespeak consent to  
volumes of restrict ions . In  the  more complex world of in termixed theorv and practice of  
corporate lav.· , the contract ing part ies ,  even i f  s t i l l  ra t ional  economic actors borrowed 
from the neoclassical microeconomic model . contract against  a background of' posi t i ve 
Lll\·. In the covent ional  v iew,  the panics submi t  to the standing legal regime when se­
lect ing the corporate form. Law and economic scholarsh ip under the rubric of the new 
theory deals w i th  this l egal addi t ion to contract ing consent by impos ing the paradigm on 
the law to the extant necessarv: S ince the f inn exists  to reduce transact ion costs ,  corpo-
458 CORNELL LA Hl REVIE W [Vo l .  74 :407 
which individual choice shapes social l i fe .  
This intrinsic l iberal ism makes the new economic theory a ttrac­
tive to the contemporary legal academic audience, the members of 
which tend to share the l iberal ideal . Prior to the theory ' s  appear­
ance, l iberalism hardly ever entered corporate law discourse .  The 
managerial is t  p icture, with i ts  hierarchies and dependencies ,  was 
heavily socialized .  Liberal ly inclined observers worked under the 
paradigm with a sense of unease and hosti l i ty ,  particularly given 
constant suggestions of sovereign interference with internal corpo­
rate affairs . The new theoris ts effected a theoretical coup when they 
h ighl ighted the market-like characteristics of  management  corpora­
t ions :  All of a sudden phenomena thought to constrain l iberal free­
dom could be  legit imated in l iberal terms .  The discomfort with the 
manageriali s t  paradigm finally received theoretical art iculat ion . 
The new theory carries addit ional a ttraction to the l iberal ob­
server. When forced to decide what is good for others , l iberals tend 
to be completely comfortable only with the uti l i tarian norm of 
wealth maximization. Whi le  recognizing the presence of o ther 
human values , they hesitate to incorporate them in the law for fear 
of inhibit ing freedom.�0H By invit ing corporate observers to ignore 
these other values ,  the new economic theory offers an enticing solu­
t ion to this problem. Liberal observers need not worry about sover­
eign intervention because actors have already given consent to a 
wealth maximizing arrangement .  The l iberal goal of autonomy and 
the uti l i tarian goal of wealth maximization for once act m 
concord . �0'1 
2 .  The Critique of Con tractual Consent  
Although the core of consent has made the nexus of contracts 
concept attractive, i t  s imul taneously ensures a well-articulated cri­
tique by its opponents . Contract law l i terature contains commen­
tary effectively challenging class ical contract ' s  conj unction of  
rate law i s  legit imate only s o  long a s  i t  serves th is  end.  Normal ly ,  o f  course, contract ing 
parties may be expected to make their own governing rules and should be left a lone to 
do so .  But  where the terms are standard,  the sovereign may save them costs bv provid­
ing the terms i n  advance. Corporate law thus is j us t i fiable so long as i t  provides the 
terms the contract ing part ies would provide for themselves at  grea ter expense if left to 
the ir  own devices . Eas terbrook & Fishel ,  I ·atmg, supra note 5 ,  at  40 I ;  Fischel ,  Cmpomle 
Governance, supra note 5 ,  at 1 264 . Where inspect ion of corporate rules pursuant  to th i s  
norm show·s that  i t  mandates terms the  parties would not  provide for themselves , then 
law and economics pursuant to t h e  new economic theory takes on a reconstructive as­
pect .  See supra the materials cited in note ! 50 :  infra materials ci ted in note 2 2 7 .  
�OH Whitford , supra note I ! , at  559 .  
�0'1  See Carlson ,  Book Review, 85  M t C I I .  L. REv.  1 34 1 ,  1 356-6 1 ( 1 987 ) : if R()senfeld ,  
supra note 1 28 ,  at  800 (d iscuss ing u t i l i tarians '  s imul taneous a t tachment to ind iv idua l i sm 
and to d i s tribut ive j us t ice) . 
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contract, consent ,  and freedom. The contract critique carries over 
to the corporate context .  For present purposes ,  i ts lessons may be 
reduced to two points .  
First ,  contract and freedom conflict intrinsically. Human free­
dom represents a lack of cons traint against the ongoing choice of 
courses of action in pursuit of one's  own purposes .  Contractual 
consent to be bound potential ly  conflicts with this freedom. The 
contract ,  and its sovereign enforcer, constrain future choices . Bind­
ing contracts and freedom coexist in complete peace only when the 
parties understand all  future appl ications of al l  contract terms upon 
granting consent. Yet even a perfectly understood contract can con­
s train freedom if a party changes i ts mind . 
Second, the contracting process works imperfectly . Contracts 
often fail  to detail rules for all contingencies . Sometimes they con­
tain rules , but articulate them unclearly . Parties often fai l  to under­
s tand the contract 's future implications .  Such imperfections 
enhance the potential for conflict between the contract and the par­
ties ' freedom of choice . 2 1 0  The danger is particularly acute under 
an obj ective regime of contract law, such as classical contract .  The 
pmver created by the classical contract often preempts the parties ' 
conscious consent .  
Contract theory outside of the classical tradition recognizes 
these problems and tends to justify binding a party to a rule not 
consciously accepted by invoking some norm in addition to consent .  
Different commentators look to different norms . But they tend to 
go beyond utility maximization , the supplemental nonliberal norm 
chosen by the new economic theorists . Communitarians look to re­
lational values , particularly preservation of the relation and hanno­
nization with society outside the relationship .2 1 1 Individualis t 
commentators have more difficulty. Charles Fried,  when forced to 
look beyond the contract ' s  l i teral words , avoids uti l i ty and justifies 
enforcement on trust and on respect for individual autonomy . In so 
doing he envisions a human actor different from the rational eco­
nomic actor. Reasonableness ,  he says, may be cons trained by fair­
ness because reasonable people seek to apply the fairness norm . 2 1 2 
2 I 0 For further discuss ion of the d i s t inct ion between contract and choice see I .  iVL"'.C­
N E I L ,  supra note 87, at  49-50;  Macnei l ,  supra note 89 .  a t  395. Macnei l  quest ions the appl i ­
cat ion of classical contract law theories ro complex con tractual rela t ions .  Equat ing an 
act o f  consent wi th ful l  p lanning, he says , i s  s i l l v .  
2 1 1 Macne i l ,  Bureaucracy, supra note 1 57 ,  at 934-39 .  
2 1 2  See C.  F R I E D ,  supra note 1 78 ,  a t  1 6- 1 7 ,  7 3 .  83 .  Fried 's  theorv of contract is rooted 
in the promise jus t i fying enforcement against  a contracting party bec:wse  the party has 
i n ten t iona l ly  invoked a convention giv ing anotbr�r mora l  grounds to expect perform­
ance. At bottom, i ndiv idual  autonomy and trus t ,  ra ther than u t i l i tv ,  f1gure as norms.  
Ut i l i t y  i s  served i ncidental ly because contracting parties accompl ish th ings .  !d. at  1 6- ! 7 . 
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Corporate law fiduciary principles res trammg management 
power draw on the same relational values that contract theory draws 
on to ameliorate the l imitations of consent .  Appropriately,  Victor 
Brudney and Robert Clark, in  their respective cri tiques of the new 
economic theory, parallel the substance of the contract crit ique of 
consent .� 1 3  They question the normative force of the act of  partici­
pation , identify values informing corporate law beyond the norms of 
discrete contracting, and envis ion a more holis tically modelled 
actor. 
More specifically,  Brudney and Clark both point out that the 
new theori s ts ' corporate contracts lack empirical grounding,� 14 so 
far reducing reali ty as to depart from it. Corporate law has s ignifi­
cant noncontractual aspects . It operates in an area beyond the con-
scious agreements that are the subject matter of legal con tract .  ?' 
Shareholders neither select managers nor issue instructions to 
them . �  1 'i Far from seeing themselves as parties to discrete contracts , 
shareholders expect managers to work hard for them and do not 
consent to management self-dealing.�  I G The shareholders become 
dependent .  The relationship is trus ting and res ts in part on fiduci­
ary underpinnings . � 1 7 These points highlight the weaknesses in the 
new theoris t s '  agency notion and the delegation of power it 
presupposes . 
To Brudney and Clark, corporate law contains the lawmakers ' 
assumptions of the characteris tics and preferences of the parties 
subject to it , rather than of some actual or implicit act of  consent . :! I H 
To the extent corporate law i s  contractual , i t  i s  contractual only met­
aphorically, l ike the philosophical social contract . :! ! ' ) Even the con­
s truction of a metaphorical corporate contract i s  a dubious exercise .  
Ex post contract cons truction on a "would have agreed to" bas is  can- ' 
not permit a s trictly rational bas i s .  The endless quantity of  contin-
��� gent considerations bearing on co�porate contracting precludes 
:! I '' Brudney. sujJm no te 8 ;  Clark, supm note 8 .  
:! I -I Brudney. supm note 8 ,  at 1 405-06 .  Legal scholars apply ing the new economic  
theorv l ike to  implv  tha t  the economis ts  have  discovered consciously determined con­
tractual arrangements .  SPP also Clark, supm note 8 ,  a t  62-63 .  
:! I r, Brudney, supm note 8. at 1 42 1 ;  Clark.  supra note 8 ,  at G 1 -62 (corporate acto rs 
consent  to legal roles but  do not  genera l ly  bargain over panicubr terms ) ; se� a lso S tone,  
sujml note 1 29 .  a t  82-83.  
� l <; Brudncv. supra note 8. at 1 405-06,  1 439-40 .  
� 1 7 Clark, supra note 8 .  at 67 .  
:! I K  !d. at 67 ;  Brudney. suj)la note 8 ,  a t  1 4 1 4- 1 5  n .29 .  
:! I 'l This is Professor Clark's poi n t .  See Clark, supra note 8, a t  6 1 .  62 .  ·rhe "social  
contract" characterizat ion comes from Ratner,  su,fJra note 1 36 ,  at 20-2 1 .  Ratner draws a 
d is t inc t ion bet\\'Cen close corporat ions and publ ic  corporat ions .  Close corporat ions in ­
voh·e private rights based on consensual agreements .  On the other hand.  the managers 
of publ ic  corporat ions do not act on  th i s  son of contractual basis . The cert ificate of 
incorporation here more closely resembles a na tional const i tu tion . .  
! 
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3 .  The Contractual Cmporation Founded on Consent-Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
Brudney and Clark both offer val id criticisms .  But despite the 
success of their respective critiques ,  neither renders the nexus of 
contracts concept irrelevant to corporate law. Brudney and Clark 
both look to practice to show the model ' s  weaknesses , but practice 
may also show its strengths . 
The l iberal association of contractual consent and human free­
dom is  inherently flawed as a universal theory of business relation­
ships ,  but as a practical matter, seems valid in  the context of discrete 
contracts . Management corporations , viewed contractually, repre­
sent complexes of both discrete and relational contract s . 22 1 Ins titu­
tional s tock and bondholders , for example,  buy and sell securities 
on the open market,  taking short term posi tions .  As both Brudney 
and Clark point out, different inves tors have differen t expectations ,  
but al l  depend on management .  On the o ther hand , ins ti tutional 
inves tors going in and out of pos it ions in given corporations enter 
into these contractual relations through discrete, arm ' s  length trans­
actions and maintain short term expectat ions .  Inves tors can protect 
themselves through divers ification and quickly exi t . 222 These inves­
tor-corporate relations have a real individual and self-reliant aspect .  
The same self-protective patterns obtain respecting many individual 
inves tors . Trus tee-beneficiary relations and their governing law are 
by no means s trictly analogous , and the values embodied in classical 
contract law have relevance. The discrete values these investors 
bring to these relationships may be read back into their init ial  mani­
fes tations of assent .  
The new economic theory offers a theoretical exploration of 
these discrete aspects of practical corporate relations . I t  i l luminates 
arm' s-length points only dimly recognized in academic  corporate 
work of the anti-managerial ist variety .  It thereby begins to explain 
the s trains of corporate doctrine that persis tently refuse to apply the 
fiduciary principle. The new theori s ts ' vast overs tatement of their 
case through their insis tence on a discrete contractual model across 
the board does not vitiate their contribution. 
Even the overs tated , absolutely di screte contractual model 
makes a posi tive contribution at a purely theoretical level . Brudney 
and Clark both correctly assert that the theory does not trans late to 
2 2 0  Brudney, supm note 8 ,  a t  1 4 1 5  n . 3 1 ;  C ia:-!�, supra note 8 ,  a t  65 .  
22 1 See supra text accompanying note 32 .  
� � �  See g·eneral!y �-\ . H I RS C H M A N ,  supra note 1 05 .  
462 CORNELL LA W REVIE W [Vol .  74 :407 
practice . The "contract" and the " consent" do not really exis t ,  and 
corporate "contracts" are in  large measure positive law constructs . 
But ,  despite this hmdamental objection ,  the new theory remains at­
tractive to a l iberal observer, even one familiar with corporate prac­
tice. In l iberal theory, l egitimating contracts need not be actual . 
Liberals caugh t between respect for individual autonomy and recog­
nition of the need for a coercive sovereign routinely surmount the 
difficul ty by employing contractarian paradigms of the formation of 
the sovereign . These collective contracts legitimate social arrange­
ments through cons tructive consent .  They never refer to individual 
behavior. Instead , they assume that al l  autonomously acting indi­
viduals in the larger social uni t have a set  of common characteri s tics .  
This  allows predictions as to whether individuals would consent  to a 
particular ins titutional arrangement .  They ass ign the actor the trait 
of rationality in determining the direction taken by this free choice.  
Jus tice then depends on whether those subject to the arrangement 
would choose i t  freely ex ante . 223 
Many in American legal cul ture practice this mode of con­
tractarian legitimation. Not surprisingly,  artfully constructed appli­
cations of i t  to large corporate bureaucracies resonate well within 
that cul ture. 
But the new economic theory ' s  p icture of l iberal-util i tarian con­
cord holds validity only in theory, and even the theoretical construct 
depends on rational economic actors denuded of significant human 
characteristics . 22·• As a result ,  its hypothetical bargaining inade­
quately captures the social real i ty real people face.  
Legal scholarship adopting the new economic theory takes dif­
ferent approaches to the problems of practical application .  Some 
legal scholars applying the neoclass ical variant s imply ignore the 
problem. This  work collapses theory into practice, treating al l  con­
tracts , discrete or collective, actual or cons tructive, as if  s imi larly 
cons tituted . 22" The work nicely manifests l iberal theoretical as-
� � �) ·rhi s  model of the l ibera l ' s  Ine thod i s  d rznvn frotn Rosenfeld .  supra note  1 28 ,  a t  
8 1 7- 1 8 . 
� ��l See Carl son.  supra note 209,  at l �6 1 -68 .  
� � 5  Ser supra the rna terials c i ted notes  54 , 9 1 :  Easterbrook & Fischel , supra note 5 ,  a t  
283-86 (argu ing agains t the e.\ posl in terpola t ion of d i sso lu t ion righ t s  and fiduc iary dut ies  
i n  c lose  corporat ion s i tuat ions because " ' there w i l l  be s i tua t ions where a l l  par t ies  decide 
that  they arc bet ter off wi thout  them . " ) :  if Fam:� ,  supra note 4 2 ,  a t  293 ( sugges t ing  that 
subordi nates monitor superiors) ,  bul  see E isenberg, supra note 3,  a t  584 n . · L  
T h e  neoclassical tendency to jus t i f)' ex i s t ing arrangements as  effic ient  market so lu­
t ions  (see. e.g. , Bays inger & B u tler, supra note 5 ,  a t  56 1 ,  564-66) has l ed Lo a whole body 
o f  l i tera ture jus t i fv ing corporate governance a rrangements as they appeared a round 
1 980.  Awkward ly, corpora te governance pract ices changed dr:�mar ical ly around 1 984 . 
See Bra t ton ,  supra note 3 ,  at 1 520-2 1 .  
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sumptions . It less  successfully explains corporate doctrine com­
posed of complexes of relational values . 
Legal s cholarship in the ins titutional variant encounters fewer 
practical problems . Inst i tutional actors better approximate real 
people .  Even so, the ins titutional i s ts  manage to deploy their actor 
and at the same time satisfy the l iberal goal of  noninterference by 
the sovereign . Ins titutional actors unders tand their own fail ings and 
erect contract s tructures around them. Their success in erecting 
these s tructures makes s ta te intervention into corporate relation­
ships unjus tifiable .  They recognize communal values , but only as 
contracting s trategies des igned as m eans to individualist ends . 
This rendition of l iberal values in an imperfect world of  transac­
tions is attractive . But i t  omits too much from the picture to afford a 
basis  for a reconstructed corporate doctrine .  The imperfect ins titu­
tional actor always remains the best judge of his or her own best  
interests ,  placing the paradigm outs ide our sense that  individuals 
often act other than in their own best interests . The poss ibi li ty of 
such errant conduct,  according to Mil l ,  is particularly likely to occur 
where the act of consent binds for a long period of time .�� � ;  Corpo­
rate legal doctrine also recognizes this poss ibi l i ty ,  providing layers 
of paternalis tic protections for inves tors . Labelled fiduciary, this 
doctrine s traddles the corporate complex of discrete and relational 
contract ,  effective and ineffective self-interested action,  and self­
protected and dependent positioning. Despite all its l iberal attrac­
t ions,  the new theory will probably fail  to suppress paternalist ic im­
pulses of lawmakers and legal scholars . ��7 These impulses of course 
remain dangerous to the freedom of corporate actors��·"-thus the 
new economic theory retains an ongoing critical role. 
D. Comments 
Placing the "con tract" in the "nexus of contract s"  concept 
against the broad background of corporate doctrine and contract 
theory dramatically reduces its heuristic force. One can , as the new 
economic theoris ts assert, account for corporate law contractual ly .  
But one can account for i t  accurately only by ex post review with an 
open concep t of contract with broad notions of consen t .  
:! :Z < i  J.S.  i'VI I LL.  PRINCI PLF.S O F  Po i.ITI C\ L  E C O :\ O M Y  950 .  9 5 2 - 5 3 .  9GO-G l ( A s h l ev e d .  
1 92 1 ) ; SPe Rosenfeld,  supra n o t e  1 2 8 .  a t  BO 1 -02 . 
:2 :2 7  Compare Kenneclv,  Palnnalts111 , supra n o t <:  ! 80 .  it'ilh Kro n m a n ,  Pntnna!is111 and the 
Law of Con lmc!s, 92 YALE L.J . 763 ( 1 98 3 )  ( e x p la na t i o n s  o f  cle c i s i o n maker p a t ernalism i n  
c o n t ra c t s ) ;  see also B r a t t o n ,  .\ln n n f'ls . .  \ fetaprinot!IPs . .  \ l!'!ajJoli l lrs o 111l 1\r'nnNl\' ' s  For111 and Sub­
slana. 6 C\RD07.0 I. . Rn. 87 1 ,  9 0 3 - ! 3  ( 1 98 5 )  ( discus s i n g  b o t h  Kennedy and hro n ma n · s  
articles ) .  
:.! :Z H  Ser KennedY, Pa/n na l/.1111 , s upm n o t e  1 80 ,  a t  1)4 2 - 4 9 .  
464 CORNELL LA W REVIE W [Vol .  74 :407 
With a more flexible notion of  contract ,  the contract h euri s tic  
can build a theoretical picture that respects corporate pract ice .  Lim­
i ting conceptions of the corporate contract ,  whether discrete or re­
lational, classical or neoclassical , managerial ist or individual is t ,  
cause distortions in the theoretical picture .  No such l imi tation 
should be privileged . Flexibil ity helps us better appreciate the 
range of values-liberal and communitarian ,  util i tarian and rela­
tional-at s take in corporate law decisions .  
CONCLUSION-THEORY AND PRACTICE 
M odels of the corporation constructed within the new eco­
nomic theory ' s  l imited analytical framework can neither conclusively 
explain the firm nor adequately serve as blueprints for an improved , 
reconstituted, ful ly rationalized future firm . Yet the theory has 
brought academic corporate law closer to business practice by h igh­
l ighting the elements of voluntary exchange in corporate relation­
ships. At the same time , the theory has mischaracterized these 
corporate contracts , making what amount to political assertions .  
The theory ' s  very appearance in legal theory affects practice. 
Its proponents advance a perspective that strikes deep pol i tical 
resonances as it  recasts the basic components of received corporate 
theory in a classic ,  sometimes extreme, individuali s t  mode .  This 
counters a decades old orthodoxy of group orientation in corporate 
policy discourse. Thus positioned , the theory can achieve a cogniza­
ble practical influence, even though it attracts only a handful of real 
adherents , by virtue of its acceptance as a legi timate,  respectable 
part of legal discourse .  This acceptance by i tself  reshapes prevail ing 
consciousness regarding management corporations in s ignificant 
ways .  It changes the ongoing debate about corporate governance, 
which often comes down to a "burden of proof" con tes t between 
proponents and opponents of governmental intervention; the con­
testant imposing the burden on the other side wins . The new eco­
nomic theory adds weigh t to the side opposing intervention . 
Al terations in business and legal practices may result ultimately 
from the new theory ' s  appearance, but they may be more enabled 
than dictated by i t .  Given this variety of practical-theoretical inter­
play, perhaps the theory has had its greates t influence already.  To­
day, power flows to the theoris t  who cons tructs a picture of  
corporate power in  appropriate "post managerialis t"  terms .  
Whatever the future interplay of theory and power, the  con­
cepts that make up theories of the firm-entity and aggregate,  con­
tract and concession, public and private, discrete and relational­
will s tay in internal opposit ion. This tendency toward contradiction 
should be accepted, not feared . The contradictions are in trinsic .  
l 
j 
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No foreseeable scholarship or legislative reform will resolve them.  
The contradictions also are wholesome. S tudying and reflecting on 
their interplay in the law enhances our  posi tive and normative un­
derstanding. Legal theories that heavily privilege one or another 
opposing concept risk posi tive error .  Theory, ins tead of denying 
the exis tence of the contradictions ,  should synchronize their coexis­
tence in law. 
From this it follows that corporate doctrine is a necessary refer­
ent for a legal theory of the firm. The doctrine provides an authen­
tic source for a positive theory-a source providing a useful 
counterweight to economic theory. The doctrine follows from prac­
tice. It is a residue of corporate l ife fil tered through and written out 
by corporate lawyers . It mediates between opposing theoretical 
conceptions . It privileges different concepts at different points , but 
unlike academic theory, i t  never does so absolutely. S tudying the 
doctrine offers a sense of how contradictory theory of the firm con­
cepts are synchronized in practice. 
